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Gregory A. W. Gilpin 
Three Essays on Public Policy, Human Capital, and Economic Growth: 
Theory and Evidence 
 
Dissertation Abstract 
 This dissertation presents three essays investigating the effect of public policies 
on human capital accumulation and economic growth. I first investigate the optimal 
quantity and quality of teachers in the framework of dynamic general equilibrium OLG 
model. The government hires teachers while constrained by the teachers’ collective 
bargaining agreement. In the process of endogenous growth, the optimal trade-off 
between the quantity and quality of teachers moves in the direction of the former. The 
number of teachers hired will grow over time while their relative human capital 
attainment will fall. This evolution of human capital accumulation is accompanied by 
increasing inequality, within the group of college educated workers in particular. 
 In the second essay, I empirically investigate the self-selection of first year 
teachers into teaching positions at union and non-union schools, the main difference 
being the entry and dismissal barriers of teachers’ unions. In a Bayesian framework with 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, I estimate how much of the propensity to remain in 
teaching can be attributed to the effect of teachers’ unions rather than the characteristics 
of individuals who tend to work in unionized schools. With the use of the counterfactual, 
I find that while teachers’ unions do lower the attrition rate, most of the difference in 
vii 
attrition rates should be attributed to the self-selection into the teaching occupation and 
not to the barriers to dismissal unions provide. 
 The third essay analyzes the implications of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social 
security system for human capital investment, economic growth and income distribution 
when individuals’ longevities are dependent on their human capital attainment. While 
PAYG pensions encourage human capital investment at a cost of lower growth in the 
short-run, it results in increased life expectancy of the subsequent generations, providing 
additional incentive to save for retirement. Thus, in the long-run, implementing PAYG 
social security causes the stock of human capital to grow; savings will increase due to the 
dynamic externality, thereby so will the aggregate output. 
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Chapter 1 
The Quantity and Quality of Teachers: 
A Dynamic Trade-off 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the dynamics of the quantity and quality of teachers in the framework of 
dynamic general equilibrium OLG model. The quantity and quality are jointly set by a 
government agency wishing to maximize the quality of basic education per student while 
bound by teachers’ collective bargaining agreement which equalizes teacher pay. Our 
model features two stages of education: basic and advanced (college), the latter being 
required of teachers. The cost of hiring teachers is influenced by the outside opportunities 
that college graduates have in the production sector. We show that this factor strengthens 
in the process of endogenous growth and moreover that it pushes the optimal trade-off 
between quantity and quality of teachers in the direction of the former. Namely, the 
number of teachers hired will grow over time while their relative (but not the absolute) 
human capital attainment will fall. This evolution of human capital accumulation is 
accompanied by increasing inequality, within the group of college educated workers in 
particular. Further, we consider the comparative dynamics effect of exogenous skill 
biased technological change represented by a positive shock to productivity of the skilled 
workers, hence to the college premium. We show that this will exacerbate the negative 
trends in the quality of basic education in relation to GDP growth. Countering this trend 
would therefore require an increase in the share of GDP spent on basic education, 
assuming that the institutional setup of the school system remains unchanged. 
 
JEL classification: H52, I2, O4 
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1.  Introduction 
Increasing focus on “individual based instruction” continues to be one of the main 
education policy priorities in the United States as a means to raising education quality. 
This is evidenced by the dynamics of student-teacher ratio which has fallen from 25.8 in 
1960 to 15.7 in 2005 (Digest for Education Statistics 2007, table 61). Research, however, 
has shown that students' test scores have not risen despite increased individualized 
instruction. This discrepancy has compelled policy makers and researchers to question 
the factors affecting students' test scores and the role of the quality of teachers vs. their 
quantity (see Hanushek et al (2005)). This paper develops a theoretical framework for 
analyzing this quantity-quality trade-off and offers an explanation to the observed trend 
biased in favor of quantity. 
Some of the changes in education statistics between 1955 and 2005 are displayed 
in the table below. It shows that the decline in the student-teacher ratio was accompanied 
by declining relative teacher salaries while the overall K-12 public education 
expenditures have been essentially flat as a share of GDP since 1970.  
 
Year Enrollment1,a Teachers1,a Pupil / teacher 
ratio1
Expenditures to 
GDP2,b
Relative Teacher 
Salary3,b,d
1955 30,680 1,141 26.9 3.3c
1960 36,281 1,408 25.8 3.6 43
1965 42,173 1,710 24.7 3.9
1970 45,894 2,059 22.3 4.6 44
1975 44,819 2,198 20.4 4.6
1980 40,877 2,184 18.7 4.0 41
1985 39,422 2,206 17.9 3.8
1990 41,217 2,398 17.2 4.3 35
1995 44,840 2,598 17.3 4.3
2000 47,204 2,941 16.0 4.5 36.5
2005 49,113 3,137 15.7 4.6
Source: Notes:
a: In thousands
b: In Percent
c: 1959 data
Table 1: Historical Data on Public Elementary and Secondary Schools From 1955:2005
d: College educated females, age 
20-29, earning less than average 
female teacher, age 20-29
1: Digest for Education Statistics 2007, Table 61
2: Digest for Education Statistics 2007, Table 25
3: Hanushek & Rivkin (2003)
 
Another significant trend observed over about the same period is the decline in 
the aptitude of teachers relative to other educated workers. Hoxby and Andrews (2004)  
estimate that in 1963  41% of all teachers were of the “middle” aptitude relative to their 
educated peers, with 17% above and 42% below the average; by comparison, in 2000, 
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28% of all teachers were of the “middle” aptitude with 5% above and 67% below 
average. Corcoran et al. (2002) provide similar results. Notably, student test scores have 
remained roughly constant despite substantial growth in per student public education 
outlays. Much attention in the literature has focused on explaining how these different 
inputs in K-12 public school system have affected students' test scores. 
Many of the conflicting conclusions in the literature concerning the factors 
affecting student performance stem from two general empirical strategies employed in 
order to estimate the returns to quality and quantity of teachers. The first strategy 
attempts to estimate the effect of teacher characteristics on student achievement while 
partially controlling the class size (see Aaronson (2007), Clotfelter (2007), Rivkin et al. 
(2005), Goldhaber and Anthony (2007)). Class size is naturally constrained by 
geographic and time specification of the observations (schools in the same state are under 
one mandated student-teacher ratio). The second empirical strategy aims to estimate how 
class size affects student achievement while attempting to control for teacher quality. 
Several studies which follow this strategy use data from policy experiments producing 
random assignment of students to smaller and larger classes. Controlling for teacher 
quality this data yields unbiased estimates of the effects of class size on student 
achievement (see Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger and Whitmore (2001), Krueger 
(1999), Jepsen and Rivkin (2002)). 
Using data from North Carolina, Clotfelter et al. (2007) conclude that teacher 
experience, test scores and regular licensure all have greater positive effects on student 
achievement, whether compared to the effects of changes in class size or to the 
socioeconomic characteristics of students. Aaronson et al. (2007) use the data on Chicago 
public high school students and teachers at the classroom level to estimate how teacher 
characteristics affect mathematics test scores. They find that replacing a teacher with 
another who is rated two standard deviations superior in quality can add 0.35 to 0.45 
grade equivalents, or 30 to 40 percent of an average school year’s worth, to a student's 
math score performance. Goldhaber and Anthony (2007) use the same North Carolina 
data to examine the effects of the National Board Certification of teachers and find mixed 
evidence on whether improved observable teacher credentials have positive impact on 
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student achievement. These results are similar to Rivkin et al. (2005) who use the UTD 
Texas Schools Project. On the other hand, Angrist and Lavy (1999) use Israel’s class size 
maximum to estimate class size effects on student achievement. They find that reducing 
class size causes significant and substantial increase in test scores for fourth and fifth 
graders, although not for third graders. Krueger (1999) analyzes data from Tennessee 
Project STAR to estimate the effects of class size reductions on student performance on 
standardized tests. His results indicate that students’ scores increase by four percentage 
points in the first year they attend smaller classes while in subsequent years the test 
scores grow by about one percentage point per year. Hanushek (1999) rebuts Krueger’s 
findings citing important design and implementation issues in the STAR project 
suggesting an upward bias in the returns to class size reduction. Krueger and Whitmore 
(2001) follow up on students who participated in the Tennessee STAR experiment and 
find that they had, on average, ACT scores of .13 standard deviations higher. 
Another approach uses longitudinal data on declining class size. Card and 
Krueger (1992) find that a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio from 30 to 25 is associated 
with a 0.4 percentage point increase in the rate of return to education. Hoxby (2000), 
however, estimates that there is no effect from decreased class size on student 
achievement. These opposing estimates are addressed by Jepson and Rivkin (2002). They 
argue that using mandated class size reduction programs as natural experiments for 
estimating the class size effect is problematic when these changes involve a trade-off 
between the quantity and quality of teachers, and that the same problem arises when time 
series data is used without the account for this endogenous trade-off. Specifically, their 
results indicate that California’s class size reduction program came at a cost of hiring 
lower quality teachers to staff additional classrooms which offset the benefits of smaller 
classes. Similarly, Hoxby (1996) finds that in unionized public school higher measured 
inputs may produce no gains to student achievement:  the unions engage in rent-seeking 
which leads to lower productivity, via teacher quality or effort, enough to offset any gains 
from the additional resources, smaller student-teacher ratios in particular.  
Thus, despite a significant attention in the literature, the questions about the 
determinants of education quality remain open. This underscores the need for a broader 
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theoretical framework, which would capture the dynamic interaction between inputs in 
education as it is influenced by labor market in the production economy. We note in this 
regard a branch of recent literature which has studied how outside job market 
opportunities have affected the quality of teachers. Flyer and Rosen (1997) report that the 
three-fold increase in direct costs of education per student is attributable to the growing 
market opportunities for women. Hanushek and Rivkin (1997) document the decline in 
the earnings of women teachers relative to women in other occupations and suggest that 
the expansion of alternative opportunities reduced teacher quality. Hanushek and Rivkin 
(2003) estimate that in 1955, 50% of all educated male workers earned less than male 
teachers, compared to 36% in 2000. Likewise, in 1955, 48% of all educated female 
workers earned less than female teachers compared to 29% in 2000. Similar analyses 
concerning the effect of the outside work opportunities on teacher quality are offered by 
Goldhaber and Liu (2003), Stoddard (2003), and Bacolad (2006). Lakdawalla (2006) 
demonstrates that a rising skill premium of educated workers due to faster technical 
change coupled with low productivity growth of skilled teachers, has lead to lower 
teacher quality. The mechanism he highlights is the substitution of unskilled teachers for 
increasingly expensive skilled teachers. 
 In this paper we present a theoretical model which incorporates some of the 
factors of education quality discussed above, in a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework where government education policy decisions affect and are affected by 
individual education and employment decisions, whereas the dynamics of human capital 
accumulation and labor productivity has a feedback effect on both. In our model, the 
government agency wishes to maximize the quality of basic education per student and 
faces a trade-off between the quality and quantity of teachers to be hired. Furthermore, 
we assume that the agency is bound by teachers’ collective bargaining agreement which 
equalizes teacher pay. It is, indeed, well documented that teachers' unions significantly 
contribute to the wage compression phenomenon. Unions provide tenure to teachers and 
tie their salary primarily to experience rather than performance. Administrators wishing 
to hire higher quality teachers are forced by the unions to then provide matching raises to 
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teachers across the board.1 Furthermore, the wage uniformity in public schools imposes 
similar wage rigidity on the private school teacher market (Lakdawalla, 2006). 
In our model, a government education agency has two policy variables: teacher 
salary, which is uniform according to the collective bargaining regime, and the number of 
teachers to be hired.  The model features two stages of education: basic and advanced 
(college), the latter being required of teachers. College graduates can also take jobs in the 
skilled labor force of the production sector and get paid a competitive wage according to 
their human capital attainment. This opportunity cost implies that the level of teacher 
salary set by the government agency will determine the top quality (human capital level) 
of a teacher who can be hired at this salary. All college graduates whose human capital is 
below this level will be motivated to take a teaching job at the same salary. Therefore, 
given the top quality cut-off determined by the government-set teacher salary, the number 
of teachers the government decides to hire will determine the lowest human capital cut-
off among teachers. Thus the total cost of hiring teachers is affected in our model by the 
outside opportunities available to skilled individuals in the production sector. We show, 
moreover, that in the process of endogenous growth this effect strengthens and that it 
pushes the optimal trade-off between quantity and quality of teachers in the direction of 
the former. Namely, in the face of rising over time cost of highly able skilled workers, the 
government agency will find it optimal to opt for increasing the number of teachers hired 
while reducing the overall relative quality of the pool of teachers. (The absolute human 
capital attainment of teachers, however, will rise along with the overall human capital 
accumulation, while sliding toward the lower tail of the distribution of college educated 
population.) Furthermore, we show that this human capital dynamics is characterized by 
increasing inequality within the group of college educated workers as well as between it 
and the unskilled. 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that unionization is not the sole explanation for the compression of teacher salaries. It is 
also due in part to the difficulty of measuring teacher productivity, especially in terms of educational value 
added given unobservable student characteristics. But even if such characteristics were observable, there 
still exists the challenge of determining criteria for performance based pay for teachers. For example, low 
ability students exhibit relatively low average gains in learning throughout the year, therefore an approach 
based on marginal improvement of students’ performance would not fairly compensate teachers for 
working with lower ability children. 
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Thus this paper offers a theory explaining the trend in education policy in favor of 
lower student-teacher ratios (i.e., higher quantity of teachers) combined arguably with 
deteriorating teacher quality, despite growing per student schooling expenditures. We 
then build on these results to further analyze the impact of exogenous technological 
change biased toward skill, i.e. augmenting productivity of skilled workers and thereby 
the college premium. We show that such technological change will exacerbate the 
negative trends in the quality of basic education in relation to GDP growth.  Specifically, 
the comparative dynamics effect (relative to the benchmark trajectory) will be 
detrimental to the aggregate quality of teachers as well as to the quality of basic 
education, due to the upward shocks to the cost of skilled labor. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with unionized public schools. Section 3 defines a competitive 
equilibrium, Section 4 derives main results, and Section 5 concludes. Appendix 1 
contains some of the more technical the proofs.  Appendix 2 contains a glossary of 
notation.  
 
 
2.  The Model 
We develop a general equilibrium growth model of an economy populated by 
overlapping generations of individuals whose life consists of three periods: childhood, 
young adulthood, and old age. We identify a generation with the period when its 
members are young adults, thus the individuals born in period 1t −  form a generation tG . 
We assume that population size is constant in each generation tG  and that it forms a 
continuum on the interval [ ]0,1 . Let (.)µ  be the induced Lebesgue measure on this set, 
so that ( )[0,1] 1µ =  for all t . 
Children make no decisions of their own and receive basic (or first stage) 
education which is provided publicly. Young adults are endowed with a unit of time and 
face an option of devoting a fixed fraction n  of it to acquiring advanced education 
(which we will also refer to as college or second stage education); the balance of time not 
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spent on education is inelastically devoted to work. Specifically, the individuals without 
college education will work for the full unit of time in the “unskilled” production 
workforce. Those with college education either work for the remaining fraction of time 
1 n−  in the “skilled” production workforce or, if qualified by the government, can work 
as public school teachers. Individuals derive income from work. They spend part of it on 
consumption when young and invest the rest to use the returns to finance their 
consumption in retirement, the last period of life. 
 
2.1. Production 
The production sector of the economy consists of private perfectly competitive firms 
producing a homogeneous capital/consumption good by means of a constant returns 
technology which uses three factors of production - physical capital as well as unskilled 
and skilled human capital. The aggregate production function is given by 
 
1
,
u sy
t t t t tY D HK H
αα θ
−
  = +  (1) 
where [0,1]α ∈ , 0D > , while Kt, utH , sytH  stand, respectively, for aggregate supply of 
physical capital, unskilled human capital, and skilled human capital employed in the 
production sector in period t . The coefficient tθ  characterizes the net productivity 
augmentation of skilled human capital (adjusted for the shorter employment duration due 
to the time spent in college) which is imbedded in technology. The sequence of { }t t oθ ∞=  
characterizing the evolution of the skill premium in the process of technological change 
is assumed to be exogenously given. 2 
 
2.2. Households 
All individuals ω of generation tG , 0,1,2,...t =  have identical intertemporal preferences 
over consumption as young adults and retirees given by  
 
, , 1ln ( ) ln ( )t t t tc cω β ω++  (2) 
subject to the life-time budget constraint 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix 2 for the glossary of notation. 
9 
 
1
, 1 , 1( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t t t t t t tc r c Iω ω τ ω−+ ++ + ≤ −  (3) 
where 1tr +  is the market interest rate, ( )tI ω  is the individual’s wage income derived from 
human capital, while tτ  is the uniform rate of labor income tax collected by the 
government. According to the production function (1) individuals working in the 
production economy receive the wage at competitive rates tw  and t twθ , respectively, per 
unit of their unskilled or skilled human capital, whichever applies. Thus the income of 
individual ω who receives only basic education and attains the level of unskilled human 
capital ( )uth ω  will be  
 ( ) ( )u ut t tI w hω ω=  (4) 
The individual ω who obtains college education, attains the level of skilled human capital 
( )sth ω  and is employed in the production sector, will receive income 
 ( ) ( )sy st t t tI w hω θ ω=  (5) 
College educated individuals who become teachers will receive income htI  to be 
specified later. 
 
2.3. Human Capital Formation 
The human capital received by each child ω of generation tG  at the first (basic) stage of 
his education is produced in period 1t −  by combining children's random innate ability 
with public education according to 
 1( ) ( )ut th Ca Eω ω −=  (6) 
where C is a positive constant, 1tE −  is a uniform quality of public schooling received by 
each child in period 1t −  while ( )a ω  is the child’s innate ability. We assume that innate 
ability is distributed independently and identically in each generation (the time indexation 
is thus omitted); specifically, the distribution is uniform on the interval [ , ]a A . To 
simplify the exposition (but at no cost to the essence of the matter) we will later let a = 0. 
We will now introduce the human capital production function for the advanced 
(college) stage of education. Consistent with Ben-Porath (1967) and Rosen (1976) we 
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assume that the gains from college education depend on one’s prior preparation, which in 
turn depends on innate ability. Moreover, we assume that college education has a pre-
requisite human capital threshold *h . Rather than an ad hoc admission requirement (we 
assume that all individuals are free to choose to go to college but base this decision 
purely on income considerations) we view this threshold as a set of benchmark skills, 
such as adequate language and mathematical proficiency whose deficit would preclude 
any benefit from learning at the advanced stage.3  Specifically, we postulate that if an 
individual ω of generation tG  chooses to go to college, he will become a “skilled” agent 
with the level of human capital given by 
 
*( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]s u ut t th bh B h hω ω ω= + −  (7) 
where (0,1)b∈  and B > 0 are given constants. Thus according to the expression (7) the 
gains from college education depend on the extent to which the individual’s pre-college 
human capital attainment ( )uth ω  exceeds the threshold *h .  
 The college education production function (7) also reflects a partial loss of pre-
college human capital, according to the coefficient b, for the purposes of skilled human 
capital. While this loss is counteracted by the net productivity augmentation tθ  of skilled 
human capital according to the economy’s production function (1), we impose a 
condition 
 
1tbθ <       (8) 
which indeed implies that individuals whose pre-college human capital ( )uth ω  is below, 
at, or even slightly above the threshold *h , will not gain from attending college and 
therefore will not choose to do so. It is likewise logical to assume that highly able 
individuals, particularly those with the highest ability level A, will benefit from attending 
                                                 
3
 See Su (2004) for a similar approach to college eligibility. One can envision that this knowledge threshold 
may evolve over time with changes in learning technology. For example, it now tends to incorporate 
computer literacy; while applicants are not tested on it for admission decisions, their progress in many 
college specialties will critically depend on it.  For the purposes of our analysis  *h  is assumed fixed. Note 
the important distinction between this knowledge threshold, which determines a student’s true 
performance, and the concept of an ad hoc admission threshold addressed in the “educational standards” 
literature, such as Betts (1998), an education policy variable that serves as a sorting device and 
employability signal.  
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college.  According to equations (6) and (7) this will be true in generation  tG   iff the 
following inequality holds: 
 ( ) *1tb B CAE Bh−+ ≥  
In Section 4 we will state specific parametric assumptions which in particular ensure that 
the above inequality does hold at all times.  
According to the expressions (6) and (7) human capital of each type, and therefore 
the corresponding income, is an increasing function of the innate ability. Therefore if a 
certain individual decides to attend college then all agents with higher ability will also do 
so. Thus in each period t  there is an ability cut-off level *ta  such that an individual ω in 
generation t  will choose to attend college if and only if his ability ( )a ω  exceeds *ta . 
(Without loss of generality we’ll make a convention that individuals with ability level *ta  
do choose to go to college.) We will later show that this college attendance ability cut-off 
level is given by the formula 
 
( )
*
*
1 1
1 t
t
t t
Bh
a
CE b B
θ
θ−
=
−+
 (9) 
which has a straightforward meaning: an individual will choose to attend college if and 
only if his wage income derived from skilled human capital given by formula (7) and 
adjusted for the net productivity augmentation tθ  will exceed his wage based on the 
unskilled human capital obtained at the first stage of education according to its 
production function (6).  
 The kinked form of the college human capital production function (7), combined 
with pre-college preparation given by (6), implies that individual’s advanced human 
capital attainment exhibits increasing returns to ability, for which the quality of basic 
publicly provided education is a complementary input. This allows us to capture an 
important and arguably realistic property of the “ability premium” of college education: 
the skill upgrade that it provides to a highly able student is disproportionately larger than 
the one gained by a less able peer. Furthermore, while higher quality of public basic 
education “lifts all boats”, more able students will derive disproportionately greater 
benefits from it. This “ability premium” argument is used in some of the recent literature 
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to explain the evidence of increasing dispersion of earnings. For example, Huggett et al. 
(2006) use life-cycle framework with a multi-stage Ben-Porath type model of human 
capital accumulation, which exhibits increasing returns to ability at higher stages of 
education, to explain the evolution of wage dispersion in the U.S.  Another strand of 
models represented by Galor and Zeira (1993) is able to explain intergenerational 
persistence of inequality by the presence of credit constraints. The underlying 
mechanism, however, is fundamentally similar: the consequence of the borrowing 
constraints is that investment in education exhibits increasing returns to agents’ 
endowments (within a certain range).4  Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) use a calibrated 
model which includes explicit early and college stages of education to apportion the 
factors, including individual ability and borrowing constraints, responsible for the 
intergenerational persistence of income inequality.  By contrast, in most models of public 
education, such as by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), human capital accumulation 
exhibits decreasing returns to private inputs, which leads to vanishing relative variation 
of income.  
 
2.4. Quality of Basic Education 
We shall now introduce the per student basic education quality tE , i.e. the public input in 
the basic education production function (6) provided in period  t, as a function of the 
quality and quantity of teachers chosen by a government agency. Recall that only college 
educated individuals are eligible to be employed as teachers. Let tΣ  be the set of 
individuals ω in generation t  employed as teachers. Let zt be the total number of teachers. 
Since population size was normalized to 1 in all generations, zt  is also the fraction of 
teachers in the overall population in generation t , as well as the student-teacher ratio for 
generation 1t +  students.  
 We define the aggregate teacher quality as the aggregate human capital of 
teachers  
                                                 
4
 Heckman and Cunha (2007) and related recent work appear to provide a unified framework for these 
approaches. 
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( ) ( )
t
s
t t tq h d
ω
ω µ ω
∈Σ
= ∫  
Likewise, the average teacher quality is given by  1 1( ) ( )
t
s
t t t t tz h d z q
ω
ω µ ω− −
∈Σ
=∫ .  The 
explicit account for the heterogeneity of teachers’ human capital attainment reflected in 
this formula is obviously an essential element of our model. Earlier papers, such as by 
Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), which explicitly modeled teacher human capital as an input 
in (compulsory) schooling, assumed that it equals to the average human capital of their 
generation. 5   
 We now define the per student quality of basic education as a Cobb-Douglas 
function of the quantity and aggregate quality of teachers: 
 t t tE z q
γ ν=  (10) 
Note that this formula corresponds to the one used by Tamura (2001) who assumed in 
particular that the role of personal instruction, i.e. that of teacher-student ratio, is more 
important for schooling effectiveness that the average quality of teachers; in our 
formulation this means that   γ ν≥ . 
 The special case of (10), when 1γ ν= =  , i.e. 
 ( ) ( )
t
s
t t t tE z h d
ω
ω µ ω
∈Σ
= ∫  (11) 
has a particularly straightforward interpretation. Assume that all teachers are perfectly 
sorted across classes, each class of equal size 1tz− , so that each is exposed student through 
his classes to a cross-section of teachers which perfectly represents their distribution of 
quality. Then the expression (11) which is equivalent to 1
( ) ( )
t
s
t
t t
t
hE d
zω
ω
µ ω
−
∈Σ
= ∫  can be 
interpreted as per student average teacher quality. 
 
                                                 
5
 Hatzor (2008) contrasts such regime where teachers are selected at random from the population with the 
one where the quality of teachers is an optimal policy decision with a trade-off against their quantity. She 
focuses on comparing the implications of these regimes for growth and welfare in the framework of 
strategic interaction between the education and budgeting authorities of the government.  
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2.5. Government 
The government funds and administers public education at the basic level with the goal of 
maximizing its quality tE , as defined above, subject to the budget constraint given by the 
revenue from a uniform labor income tax at a flat rate tτ . To this end in each period t , 
the government must set teacher salary htI  and the number of teachers to be hired tz . As 
discussed in the Introduction, we postulate that all teachers in generation tG  receive 
equal salary, according to a collective bargaining agreement. Since college educated 
individuals have an option to work in the production sector for a competitive wage as 
defined by the expression (5), the government’s choice of teacher salary htI  will uniquely 
determine the highest level of human capital attainment th among individuals who will 
choose to become teachers. Indeed it should satisfy the equation 6 
 
h
t t t tw h Iθ =  (12) 
Thus all college graduates with human capital level ( )sth ω  at or below th  will be 
obviously motivated to accept employment as a teacher rather than work in the 
production sector. However, the government’s goal to maximize the overall education 
quality for a set number of teachers tz  implies that the set tΣ  of teachers the government 
will hire consists of all individuals whose level of human capital ( )sth ω  attained in 
college falls into the interval [ , ]t th h  where the minimum teacher qualification threshold 
th  is determined by the intended number of teachers, i.e. the measure 
 ( )| ( )st t t tz h h hµ ω ω= ≤ ≤  (13) 
where the top cut-off   th  is determined, according to (12), by the teacher salary  htI  set 
by the government.  
                                                 
6
 Since one’s work career is summarily represented in our model by one time period, we do not model the 
wage dynamics over the course of a worker’s or teacher’s career as he accumulates seniority and 
experience. The appropriate understanding of the income variables in this framework is that they represent 
aggregates over the entire career, such as respective present values at the career’s outset. While teachers’ 
union collective bargaining agreements stipulate wage differentials based on seniority, equation (12) should 
be understood as the comparison of respective aggregates over the course of the alternative careers in 
question. 
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Recalling the production functions of basic and advanced education given, 
respectively, by the expressions (6) and (7), we define the cut-off innate ability levels 
andt ta a  which characterize the teachers who possess, respectively, the cut-off levels of 
human capital andt th h  induced by the government policy choice. In other words, 
 
* *
1 1
and( ) ( )
t t
t t
t t
h Bh h Bh
a a
b B CE b B CE− −
+ +
= =
+ +
 (14) 
For the government policy choice of htI , tz , to be feasible, the minimum teacher 
qualification threshold th  defined by (13) obviously must belong the range of human 
capital levels attained by college graduates. In other words, the corresponding ability 
level ta  must exceed the college attendance cut-off level *ta .  
Thus according to (10) the government’s basic education quality optimization 
problem can be restated as  
 
,
*
max
subject to (13)
and
t t
t
z h
t t t t t
t t
E
z w h T
a a
θ =
≥
 (15) 
where tT  
 is the tax revenue collected by the government in period t . 
Thanks to our assumption of the uniform distribution of innate ability on the 
interval [ , ]a A  and according to the basic and advanced education production functions 
(6) and (7) we can simplify expressions (10) and (13), respectively, as 
 
[ ]
2 2
12( )( )
t t t
t t t
t
z h h
E z q
A a b B CE
νγ
γ ν
ν
−
 − = =
− +
 (16) 
                                            
1( )( )
t t
t
t
h h
z
A a b B CE −
−
=
− +
 (17) 
and therefore problem (15) to maximize the quality of basic education tE  subject to the 
government budget constraint can be restated as 
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[ ]
2 2
,
1
*
max
2( )( )
subject to (17),
and
t t
t t t
z h
t
t t t t t
t t
z h h
A a b B CE
z w h T
a a
νγ
ν
θ
−
 − 
− +
=
≥
 
or equivalently, according to (17), as 
 
( )
,
*
max 2
subject to (17),
and
t t
t t t
z h
t t t t t
t t
h h z
z w h T
a a
νν γ ν
θ
− ++
=
≥
 (18) 
 Note that the optimal lower and upper cut-off levels of teachers’ human capital 
,t th h  are related through the optimal choice of their number tz  according to equation 
(17). The optimization in problem (18) thus expresses the trade-off between the quantity 
and quality of teachers to be hired. The quality of the top teacher th  will not only 
determine his salary ht t t tI w hθ=  due to his outside option as a skilled worker, but will set 
the identical salary for all other teachers according to the equal pay based collective 
bargaining agreement. Conversely, teacher salary htI  set by the government will uniquely 
determine the top teacher quality th . Therefore the total teachers’ wage bill in the 
government budget constraint is given by t t t tz w hθ . 
According to the relationships (14), the expression (17) is equivalent to 
 
t t
t
a a
z
A a
−
=
−
 (19) 
Therefore using relationships (14) to express th and th  and then eliminate ta  according 
to formula (19), we obtain 
( ) ( )( )
2 2
*
1 1
1
1
2( )( ) 2
t tt
t t t t t t
t
h hq b B CE a Bh z A a b B CE z
A a b B CE − −−
−  = = + − − − + − +  
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so we can restate the government’s education quality optimization problem (18) as 
              
( ) ( )( )
( )
*
1 1
,
*
1
*
max 2 2 2
subject to
( )
t t
t t t t t t
z a
t t t t t t
t t t
E b B CE a Bh z A a b B CE z
z w b B CE a Bh T
a z A a a
νν γ ν
θ
− +
− −
−
 = + − − − + 
 + − = 
− − ≥
 (20) 
 Figure 1 below offers an illustration for the government's education quality 
optimization problem in period t .  The horizontal axis maps the ability of current 
workers. The vertical access represents wage income. For unskilled workers it is given by 
u
t tw h , while for the skilled production sector workers it is st tw h . The sloped line 
represents the distribution of incomes of production sector workers in generation t  , in 
relation to individual ability according to the formulas (6) and (7), where the kink 
corresponds to the ability cut-off for college attendance *ta .  
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 The vertical bars in the figure illustrate some of the feasible government 
education policy combinations of the number of teachers to be hired and teacher salaries: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 3, , , , ,h h ht t t t t tz I z I z I , from left to right, satisfying the government's budget 
constraint. The width of the bar corresponds to the number of teachers tz  while its height 
stands for teacher salary htI , so the bar’s area is the total expenditure. Policy ( )1 1, ht tz I  
represented by the far left bar in the figure is characterized by the lowest student-teacher 
ratio (the largest quantity of teachers) but also the lowest teacher quality. This policy 
option is highly inefficient in terms of education quality derived from the given budget 
revenue, as shown by the large deadweight loss represented by the triangular portion of 
the bar located above the sloped line: this is the excess salary paid to teachers above their 
opportunity cost value. The deadweight loss is the highest here because this policy 
involves hiring an inefficiently large number of low quality teachers who nevertheless 
have to be paid at the same rate as their best peer. The policy ( )3 3, ht tz I  (far right in the 
figure) has the highest teacher quality. This set of education policies minimizes the dead 
weight loss associated with collective bargaining but still has low per pupil education 
quality due to small number of teachers, i.e. high student-teacher ratio. The interior 
policy option ( )2 2, ht tz I  is where the per student education quality is maximized, providing 
the balance in terms of student-teacher ratio and the deadweight loss associated with the 
span of teacher quality. 
 
 
3.  General Equilibrium and Optimal Policy 
We can now summarize the fundamental elements of the model and their relationships in 
a general equilibrium framework. We will first define the dynamic general equilibrium 
for given government education policy parameters and then incorporate the government’s 
optimal policy into the recursive dynamic general equilibrium framework. 
 Given the sequence of tax rates 0{ }t tτ ∞=  and the sequence of government education 
policy parameters 0{ , }ht t tI z ∞= , i.e. teacher salaries and the numbers of teachers hired in 
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each period, respectively, as well as the initial period 0t =  aggregate supply of capital 
0K , the distributions of the retirees’ consumption levels 1,0 ( )c ω− , and per student basic 
education quality 1E−  provided  to generation 0G  individuals as children, we define the 
dynamic general equilibrium as a collection of sequences of 
(a) factor prices 1 0{(1 ), ,  }t t t t tr w wθ ∞+ =+  respectively of physical, unskilled and skilled 
human capital as inputs in production in period t ; 
(b) aggregate variables { }* 0, , ,, , ,
sy
t t
u
t t t t t t
Y K H H T E a
∞
=
, i.e., respectively, aggregate 
output, inputs of physical, unskilled and skilled human capital in production, 
government’s tax revenue, the quality of basic education provided to each student in 
period t , as well as the endogenous innate ability cut-off for college attendance; 
(c) distributions of individual consumption and education decisions 
{ }, 0, 1( ), ( ), ( ), ( )
u s
t t t t t t t
c c h hω ω ω ω
=+
∞
, as well as employment decisions by college 
graduates 
such that 
 
(i) the factor prices are determined competitively, i.e. are set equal to the marginal  
products of respective inputs: 
11
11 , (1 )u sy u syt t t t t t t t t tr DK H H w DK HH
α αα αα θ α θ
− −−
++ = + = − +        
(ii) each individual [0,1]ω∈  in generation tG  makes a decision whether to go to 
college and if so whether to be employed as a teacher or in the production sector 
so as to maximize his income while taking as given basic education quality 1tE − , 
production sector wage rates tw  and t twθ  (for unskilled and skilled labor, 
respectively), teacher salary htI  and the number of teachers tz  to be hired, 
whereas his human capital level ( ) or ( )u st th hω ω  (depending on his college 
attendance decision) is determined according to the education production 
functions (6) and (7); (note that according to equation (12) and the collective 
bargaining agreement, teacher salary will exceed production sector wage for all 
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but the top quality teacher, so the government teacher employment limit tz  will 
bind;) 
(iii) based on his income ( )tI ω  determined according to (ii), each individual [0,1]ω∈  
in generation tG  makes his young- and old-age consumption decisions 
, , 1( ), ( )t t t tc cω ω+  by solving the optimization problem (2)-(3) while taking the rates 
of interest 11 tr++  and tax tτ  as given; 
(iv) the quality of basic education tE  provided to generation 1tG +  individuals (as 
children) is determined by the expression (10) while the set of teachers tΣ  is 
defined by individual employment decisions according to (ii) and the number of 
teachers hired tz  is as given by the government’s policy; 
(v) the markets for goods, physical capital, and skilled and unskilled labor clear in 
each period: 
, 1, 1
[0,1] [0,1]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t tY c d c d
ω ω
ω µ ω ω µ ω− −
∈ ∈
= +∫ ∫ , (21) 
1
1 , 1
[0,1]
(1 ) ( ) ( )t t t t tK r c d
ω
ω µ ω−+ +
∈
= + ∫ ,  (22) 
*( )
( ) ( )
t
u u
t t t
a a a
H h d
ω
ω µ ω
≤ ≤
= ∫ ,  (23) 
* ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
tt
sy s s
t t t t t
a a A
H h d h d
ωω
ω µ ω ω µ ω
∈Σ≤ ≤
= −∫ ∫  ,  (24) 
where the ability cut-off for college attendance *ta  is determined by individual 
college attendance decisions as defined in (ii); 
(vi) the aggregate tax revenue is composed of labor income taxes collected from all 
categories of employees, i.e. 
( )u sy ht t t t t t t t tT w H w H z Iτ θ= + +  (25) 
 
We can now define the government’s optimal education policy in period t  
recursively, based on the above general equilibrium construct. Namely, the government 
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chooses teacher salaries htI  and the number of teachers tz  for period t  by solving the 
optimization problem (18) (or, equivalently, problem (20)) where the top teacher quality 
th  is determined by equation (12), while taking as given the economy’s general 
equilibrium values of production sector wage rate tw , aggregate tax revenue tT  and the 
distribution of skilled human capital attainment ( )sth ω  by generation tG  individuals. 
Noting the mutual dependence of the general equilibrium variables in period t  
and the government’s optimal education policy we define the Education-Economy 
recursive dynamic equilibrium (RDE for brevity) as a fixed point of this relationship, 
recursively determined for each period t . 
 
Remark. Since we assumed that individuals make a decision whether to attend college 
solely on the basis of maximizing income, it is clear that the ability cut-off for college 
attendance *ta  defined in part (ii) of the definition of the dynamic general equilibrium, 
should satisfy inequality 
 
( )
*
*
1 1
1 t
t
t t
Bh
a
CE b B
θ
θ−
≤
−+
 (26) 
Indeed, according to (6), (7) and (4), (5), an individual with ability exceeding the right 
hand side of (26) will certainly increase his income by going to college. In fact, we will 
show in the next section that in the RDE inequality (26) is satisfied as equality, i.e. 
formula (9) is true. 
 
 
4.  Analysis of the Model 
To simplify the exposition we will assume henceforth without any substantive loss of 
generality that parameter 0a = , thus innate ability in each generation is distributed 
uniformly on the interval [0, ]A . We begin by analyzing the government’s optimal 
education policy problem given by the equivalent formulations (18) or (20). 
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We impose the following restrictions on the economy’s parameters, where 1E−  is 
an exogenously given per student basic education quality provided to generation 0G  
individuals. 
 
Assumption 1. 
( ) ( )
( )
1 / 21
*2 /2 /
1
1 1 1
2 1
t
t
t
Bhb B C
b B ACE
A
γ ν
γ νγ ν τγ
τ
γ ν γ τ
ν
+
++
−
      
+ − − >         + − +       
  
is true for any 0,1,...t =  
 
Assumption 2. 
( ) ( )
1/ 2
*
1
(1 ) 1 11
2 2 1
t t
t t
Bh
b B ACE b B
ν τ τγ
γ ν γ τ θ−
      −
− − >         + − + +       
  
 is true for any 0,1,...t =  
 
 The above assumptions require that education taxes tτ  not be too small while not 
exceeding 1
2
γ
ν
− , which of course imposes a requirement that  γ, the relative importance 
of the teacher-student ratio for schooling effectiveness (see formula (10)), should not be 
substantially greater than ν, the relative importance of the teacher quality.  The main 
thrust of the assumptions, however, concerns the parameters which characterize 
educational gains. Assumption 1 is satisfied if parameter C  characterizing the human 
capital gains in basic education according to (6), is sufficiently large. Assumption 2 will 
hold if ( )b B+ , a productivity characteristic of the college education production function 
(7), is large enough.  
Based on these assumptions we will characterize the optimal solution of the 
education quality optimization problem in terms of the optimal number of teachers tz  for 
period t , the corresponding range of teachers’ human capital, i.e. its upper and lower cut-
off values th , th  induced by the policy and the corresponding cut-off innate ability levels 
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,t ta a . In the process we will establish the following important facts (see Appendix 1 for 
the proofs): 
 
Lemma 1 (Growth of Basic Education Quality). The recursive equilibrium dynamics 
exhibits sustained growth of the quality of per student basic education. Specifically, there 
is a rate 1g >  such that 1t tE gE −>  is true for all 0,1,...t =  
 
Lemma 2 (The Interiority Property). In the recursive dynamic equilibrium, the ability 
of the least qualified teacher exceeds the college attendance cut-off ability in all time 
periods, i.e. *tta a>  is true for 0,1,...t = . Thereby the human capital of the least qualified 
teacher will not be the lowest among his contemporary college graduates. 
 
Lemma 3.  The ability cut-off for college attendance *ta  satisfies equality (9), i.e. 
 
( )
*
*
1 1
1 t
t
t t
Bh
a
CE b B
θ
θ−
=
−+
 
which means that an individual will choose to attend college if and only if his resulting 
skilled human capital given by formula (7) adjusted for the net productivity augmentation 
tθ  will exceed his unskilled human capital derived from the basic stage of education 
according to its production function (6). 
 
We now proceed to solving the optimization problem (20). According to the 
teacher salary equation (12) and the tax revenue formula (25), the government budget 
constraint can be stated as 
 ( ) ( )1 u syt t t t t t t tz h H Hτ θ τ θ− = +  (27) 
Using the education production functions (6) and (7) and the assumption that innate 
ability is uniformly distributed on [0, ]A  we can rewrite the general equilibrium 
relationships (23), (24) as 
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+
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∫ ∫
 (29) 
Therefore expressing th  through ta  according to the relationship in (14) we can rewrite 
the budget constraint (27) as 
  
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
*
1
*
* 2 2 * 2 2 2 *1
1
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
t t t t
t t
t t t t t
t
t
t t
t
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z b B CE a Bh
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A A
τ
τ θτ
θ
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−
−
− + − =
   + + − − + − − − +  
 (30) 
We now eliminate variables *ta  and ta  from (30) by substituting the value of *ta  given by 
(9) according to Lemma 3, and using the expression t t ta a Az= −  which follows from the 
relationship (19) since we set 0a = . This immediately turns expression (30) into a linear 
equation in terms of variable ta  which yields 
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )( )( )
2
** *
2
1 1 1
21
2 12
tt t t
t
t t t t t
Bhz A ABh Bh
a
b B CE z b B CE b B b B ACA E
θτ τ
θ− − −
 
 + + −
 + + + −

+

=
+
(31) 
This expression incorporates the government budget constraint of problem (20). That 
problem’s objective function, upon substituting the expression (31) for ta , becomes a 
function of a single variable tz . We will solve for its unconstrained maximization and 
then refer to Lemma 2 which ensures that the only remaining constraint *t t ta Az a− ≥  in 
the government optimization problem (20) is automatically fulfilled. 
Thus we are looking at the unconstrained maximization of the following function: 
( )
( )( )
( )( ) 22 *21 1*
1
( )
1
2 2 1 2
t t t
t t t t tt t
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t t
F z q z
b B CE b B ACE zB hBh z
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ν γ
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−
=
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= − − 
 + − 
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Its first order necessary condition is given by the equation  
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 ( ) ( )1 1 111 0t t t t t tz q b B ACE z qγ ν γ νγ ν τ− + −−− − + =  (32) 
yielding unique non-negative solution: 
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 (33) 
It is straightforward to verify that this solution also satisfies the second order sufficient 
condition of the maximization problem. Substituting expression (33) back into formula 
(31) we obtain 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )( )( )
2
** *
2
1 1 1
21
12 2
tt
t
t t t t t
Bhaz Bh Bh
a
b B CE z b B CE b B
A
A b B ACE
θτ τ
θ− − −
 
 + + − + + + − +

=


+
)
 
which simplifies, by using equation (33) again, into 
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Recall that t t ta a Az= −  according to (19) since we set 0a = . Applying this to (34) we 
obtain 
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 (35) 
Observe that the education policy optimization as well as the individuals’ and the 
production sector’s general equilibrium reactions are determined recursively. Indeed, 
according to expressions (33) - (35), education quality 1tE −  uniquely determines optimal 
education policy in period t , i.e. the number of teachers, as well as the range of their 
innate abilities and thereby, due to (14), the range of their human capital attainment. This 
in turn will uniquely determine college attendance and employment decisions by 
generation t  individuals, hence their incomes and their allocations. Government’s 
education policy will also determine the current period’s basic education quality tE , so 
the recursion continues. 
26 
Consider now the effect of the previous period’s education quality 1tE −  on 
education decision variables in period t . By differentiating the expressions (9) and (33) 
we obtain: 
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 According to (34) and (35), respectively, we can write 
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Therefore according to (33) 
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Thus the expression (38) will be negative as long as the inequality 
  
( )
1/2
1
2 1 2 1 2
2 tt t
t t
τ γτ τγ γ
ν γ τ ν γ τ γ
ν   − +      
>          + − + −        
       (41) 
is true, which is certainly the case under the non-binding condition  4
5 2 /t
τ
ν γ
<
+
  on the 
tax rate (see Appendix 1 for the proof  of this assertion).  Comparing expressions (38) 
and (39) one can see that negativity of (38) implies the same for (39). Therefore we can 
conclude that  
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Combining these facts with Lemma 1, which shows that education quality 1tE −  does in 
fact grow over time, we obtain our central result. 
 
Theorem 1 (Dynamics of the Quantity and Quality of Teachers).  The recursive 
dynamic equilibrium (RDE) exhibits the following evolution of education policy 
variables:  
- the quantity of teachers  tz   grows over time; 
- the relative quality of teachers characterized by the range of their innate abilities 
falls:  both the upper and the lower cut-offs  ,t ta a  decrease over time; 
- the college attendance ability cut-off  *ta   also drops over time and (according to 
Lemma 2) remains consistently below the lower ability cut-off for teachers  ta . 
 
Recall that according to relationships (14) 
 ( ) ( )* *1 1andt t t t t th a b B CE Bh h a b B CE Bh− −= + − = + −  
Therefore due to (34) and (35), respectively, as well as to (33) we can write 
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This leads to the following. 
 
Corollary.  As the relative quality of teachers falls over time in the RDE (according to 
the Theorem), the absolute quality of teachers characterized by their human capital 
attainment grows:  both the human capital of the top teacher and the least qualified one, 
,t th h  , rise over time. 
 
Discussion. The intuition for the above results derives from the mechanics of economic 
growth in our model. Rising per student quality of basic education (Lemma 1) opens up 
the opportunity to pursue higher education for an expanding group of students. Namely, 
college attendance becomes worthwhile for an ever broader population, adding on 
students with relatively low ability. At the same time, the human capital attainment of 
highly able students increases disproportionately relative to their less able peers due to 
increasing returns to ability exhibited by the college education production function (7). 
Thus economic growth drives the rise of income inequality within the group of college 
graduates. As a result, hiring high ability individuals as teachers becomes a relatively 
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more expensive option, which pushes the quality-quantity trade-off in the education 
policy in favor of the latter.  
 Figure 2 below illustrates the evolution of the optimal education policy choices 
along with the evolution of income distribution in successive time periods, t  and 1t + . 
The part of the graph pertaining to period  t   corresponds to the illustration given in 
Figure 1 of Section 3: the dashed sloped line represents the income distribution of 
production sector workers, while the light shaded bar depicts the optimal education 
policy (the bar’s width tz  is the number of teachers while its height is teacher salary).  
 
 
 
 The solid sloped line represents wage income distribution in period 1t + .  It 
exhibits a kink further to the left, i.e. a lower college attendance ability cut-off than in 
period t , consistent with Theorem 1. Furthermore, the comparison of the solid and 
dashed lines confirms the fact discussed above that the benefit derived by skilled 
individuals from the quality of basic education grows disproportionately with their 
ability. This implies the rising relative cost of highly able teachers and results in the shift 
of the quantity-quality trade-off depicted by the position of the dark shaded bar, the 
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government optimal education policy choice in period 1t +  , to the left of the period  t ‘s 
light shaded bar, as stated in Theorem 1.   
 The argument in the above discussion concerning the growing relative cost of 
high ability individuals is made explicit by the following result which characterizes the 
evolution of income inequality in our model. 
Based on the income formulas (4)-(5), the human capital accumulation formulas 
(6)-(7) and using the uniform distribution of abilities as well as the formula (9) for the 
threshold ability between the groups, we can obtain the mean income of unskilled 
individuals: 
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and the mean income of the skilled (ignoring the distortion due to collective bargaining in 
the education sector): 
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Thus the inequality between the groups can be characterized by 
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This expression obviously increases in basic education quality, which according to 
Lemma 1 rises over time. 
 The inequality within the skilled group (ignoring the aforementioned distortion) is 
characterized by 
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which also grows with the rise of basic education quality. One can rewrite this 
expression, according to (9), as 
    
( ) *
*
1
ts
t
t t
b B BhA
a CE
θ
σ
−
+  
= − 
 
 
31 
This demonstrates that the upward trend of the absolute disparity between the highest and 
lowest incomes of skilled workers can be attributed to two factors: (i) the rise of basic 
education quality 1tE −  which increases the human capital and thereby the incomes of all 
workers, but disproportionately more so at the high end of the ability distribution; (ii) 
falling, according to Lemma 2, college attendance ability cut-off  *ta , which brings lower 
ability workers into the fold of the skilled hence increasing the intra-group inequality. We 
summarize the above results as Theorem 2. 
 
Theorem 2 (The Evolution of Income Inequality).  The recursive equilibrium dynamics 
exhibits growing inequality within the group of skilled individuals, as well the rise in 
inequality between this group and the unskilled. 
 
As we discussed above and in Section 2, this result is due to the absolute growth 
of the quality of per student publicly provided basic education, which has unequal impact 
on individuals across the distribution of abilities because of the complementary 
relationship between individual ability and quality of education. 7 
The recent growth literature which presents evidence of rising dispersion of 
incomes of skilled workers over the last decades attributes this to the skill biased nature 
of technological change (see Acemoglu (1998), (2000), Galor and Moav (2000)). While 
our results on income inequality have been derived exclusively from the impact of 
growing public provision of basic education, one should expect that a rise in skill 
premium tθ  will exacerbate these effects.  
We will now introduce the exogenous skill biased technological change into the 
model, given by positive shocks to the skill premium coefficients tθ  , and will explore its 
effects on the  education policy variables and the quality of education. Specifically, we 
consider the recursive dynamic equilibrium (RDE) corresponding to the original 
                                                 
7
 A somewhat similar argument for the magnifying effect that greater public education funding may have 
on income inequality is advanced by Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) in the presence of complementarity 
between public and parental private inputs, imperfect altruism, and borrowing constraints. The fact of such 
complementary relationship and its implications for inequality was documented for the case of Britain by 
LeGrand (1982). 
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(benchmark) exogenously given sequence { }t t oθ ∞=  and assume that the productivity 
augmentation of skilled labor receives a positive shock from time  t0 on, i.e. that for  t = 
t0, t0+1, … the values tθ  are replaced with some t tθ θ′ > .  We will characterize the effect 
of this exogenous change on the RDE, particularly on the education policy variables. We 
obtain the following comparative dynamics result (see Appendix for the proof). 
 
Theorem 3 (The Effect of Skill Biased Technological Change).  Consider the 
comparative dynamics experiment described above where skill premium coefficients tθ   
receive a positive shock from period  t0  on.  The corresponding recursive dynamic 
equilibrium, relative to the benchmark RDE, will be characterized, for t ≥ t0 , by   
- lower quantity of teachers  tz ; 
- lower aggregate quality of teachers  qt  and therefore 
- lower quality of basic education Et . 
 
Note the negative effect on both the number and aggregate quality of teachers 
which is due to an upward shock to the cost of skilled labor. The Theorem thus shows 
that the technological change biased toward skilled labor will have a detrimental effect on 
the absolute quality of basic education, exacerbating the negative effect of a secular 
downward trend in the relative quality of teachers stated in Theorem 1.  These results will 
apply, in particular, when the education tax rate  τ  stays constant, which means that 
education budget grows at the rate of GDP growth. This leads to an important implication 
of our result:  given the negative impact of rising skill premium on the quality of 
education, a policy aimed at neutralizing this effect would require an increase in funding 
of education (assuming no change in the institutional setup of the school system and 
teachers’ labor market) at a rate faster than GDP growth, i.e. raising the fraction of GDP 
devoted to education.  A proper interpretation of this conclusion follows directly from our 
results: the relative cost of maintaining a given teacher quality standard will rise over 
time.  
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5.  Conclusions 
Over the last forty years, education policy in the U.S. has changed significantly, focusing 
in particular on lowering the student-teacher ratio. We have developed a model which 
offers an insight into this evolution by relating it to the changes in the US economy 
characterized by rising skill premium and overall income inequality. We argue that 
teacher wage compression due in large part to collective bargaining agreements has a 
significant effect on decisions concerning quantity-quality trade-offs in hiring teachers. 
Our model predicts that as incomes of college educated individuals rise and become more 
dispersed, education policy-makers are forced to adjust relative teacher salaries and 
thereby quality standards. Education quality is optimized by lowering relative quality of 
teachers while increasing their numbers. This causes the higher ability college educated 
people to choose private sector employment which offers higher reward to skilled 
workers.  
 We argue moreover that a rise in skill premium caused, in particular, by skill 
biased technological change will exacerbate the negative trends in the relative quality of 
education. Indeed, the labor of college graduates will further appreciate relative to the 
average wage and hence relative to the tax revenue. Countering this trend would therefore 
require an increase in the share of GDP spent on basic education, assuming that the 
institutional setup of the school system remains unchanged.  
 Our finding that skill biased technological change can have a negative effect on 
the quality of education is an interesting case of negative feedback, since SBTC literature 
points to the rise in the supply of skill due to growing availability of education as its 
underlying cause.  Furthermore, this leads to an issue which appears important for future 
research on the aggregate long term effects of SBTC: as the technical change brings 
about productivity gains, one needs to factor in its effects on the cost and quality of 
education and the corresponding policy responses in order to assess the full long-term 
impact.   
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Appendix 1.  Proofs 
We will first prove Lemmas 1 and 2 under the hypothesis that Lemma 3 is correct. We 
will then prove that Lemma 3 is indeed correct in the recursive dynamic equilibrium, and 
thereby the imposition of the hypothesis will not have diminished the generality of (or 
create circularity problems with) the argument.   
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
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Therefore we can write 
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Thus, in order to prove the Lemma it is sufficient to show that for all 0,1,...t =  
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which is indeed true according to Assumption 1 and by the induction argument.  
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Proof of Lemma 2. 
Based on Lemma 3 we use expression (9) for *ta  . Then according to (35) our task of 
proving the inequality *tta a> . is equivalent to verifying the inequality 
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Upon substituting the expression (33) for tz , the last inequality becomes 
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Under Lemma 3 the right hand side in (42) is smaller than 
( )t
A
b Bθ +
 since * .ta A< . 
Therefore according to (41) in order to prove inequality (42) it is by far sufficient to 
establish 
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which is indeed true for all 0,1,...t =  according to Assumption 2 combined with Lemma 
1.  
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Proof of Lemma 3. 
The above proofs were based on the hypothesis that Lemma 3 is correct, i.e. that the 
ability cut-off for college attendance *ta  satisfies equality (9), i.e. we proved that if 
college attendance cut-off ability is 
( )
*
*
1 1
1 t
t
t t
Bh
a
CE b B
θ
θ−
=
−+
 then the optimal education 
policy requires that all teachers’ ability strictly exceed this threshold. This in turn means 
that the marginal college graduate will be employed in the production sector. As we 
explained after stating equality (9), if an individual with ability below *ta  attended college 
his skilled human capital adjusted for the net productivity augmentation tθ  will be 
inferior to his unskilled human capital derived from the first stage of education, therefore 
a job in production sector’s skilled labor force would not compel such individual to 
attend college. Thus the only way the violation of Lemma 3 could occur is if such 
individual had an opportunity to be hired as a teacher. Compare, however, optimization 
problem (20) where 
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One can easily see that the only difference would be lower tax revenue tT  in the former 
case. Therefore such government policy would be inferior to the one where 
( )
*
*
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a
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. Thus the latter indeed characterizes the recursive dynamic 
equilibrium optimum, i.e. Lemma 3 is correct.  
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Proof of Inequality (41). 
We rewrite the inequality by squaring its both sides:  
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Proof of Theorem 3. 
The proof will proceed by induction argument.  
Consider firstly the effect of a positive shock to coefficient tθ   in period  t=t0  on 
education policy variables in this same period.  According to (33) direct derivative  t
t
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θ
∂
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Therefore, according to (34) and (35), respectively, we can write 
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Recall that according to the derivation of (20) 
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since we have assumed  0a = . Using formula (34) we can rewrite the above as  
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which implies, according to (43), that  
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for  t=t0 . Combining (43) and (46) and referring to (10) we can conclude that for  t=t0    
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t
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∂
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 We can now proceed to the next step of the induction and evaluate the effect born 
by the education policy variables in period  t=t0+1, keeping in mind two sources of this 
effect: the direct effect of higher value of  
0 1t
θ +  and the indirect one caused by lower 
education quality in the previous period  
0t
E  as established in (48). The results in (43), 
(47) and (48) show that the direct effects on the variables   1 1 1, ,t t tz q E+ + +  in any period  
t+1  of a contemporaneous rise in 1tθ +  are negative. For the purposes of completing the 
induction argument it will therefore be sufficient to prove that a decline in tE   will have a 
negative effect on  1 1 1, ,t t tz q E+ + + , in other words that the derivatives of these variables 
with respect to  tE  are all positive.   
According to (33) the derivative 
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 which according to Lemma 3 is equal to  1 *1 tA a−−   and 
therefore  positive.  Thus we can conclude that   
1 0t
t
z
E
+∂ >
∂
          (49) 
Rewriting expression (46) for period t+1: ( ) ( )1 21 1
1 t
t t tq A b B CE z
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γ
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−
= + , we 
note that a rise in tE  affects 1tq +  directly (obviously positively) as well as indirectly 
42 
through 1tz + , also positively according (49). We can therefore conclude that 1 0t
t
q
E
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∂
. 
This combined with (49) implies due to (10) that 1 0t
t
E
E
+∂ >
∂
. Thus according to the above 
discussion the Theorem’s proof is complete.  
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Appendix 2.  Glossary of Mathematical Terms 
 
β
 
Discount factor in individual intertemporal preferences 
tτ  Labor income tax rate in period t 
tT  Total government revenue in period t 
a
 Lower bound on innate ability, from Section 4 on a =0 is assumed 
A  Upper bound on innate ability 
( )a ω
 
The innate ability of individual ω 
*
ta  Ability cut-off level for attending college in period t 
( )uth ω  Unskilled individual’s level of human capital in period t 
u
tH  Aggregate unskilled human capital in goods production in period t 
( )sth ω  Skilled individual’s level of human capital in period t 
s
tH  Aggregate skilled human capital in period t 
sy
tH  Aggregate skilled human capital in goods production in period t 
C  Productivity coefficient of compulsory basic education 
tE  Public education quality in period t 
b  Coefficient of in-college depreciation of pre-college human capital. 
B  Productivity coefficient of higher education 
*h  Human capital threshold for admission to college 
D  TFP coefficient in the goods production sector 
α
 Physical capital income share in the goods production sector  
tθ  
Productivity augmentation of skilled human capital (skill premium) in the 
production sector in period t 
γ  Returns to quantity of teachers 
ν
 Returns to quality of teachers 
tΣ  Set of individuals employed as teachers in period t 
tz  
Number of teachers (the share of teachers in the working population) in 
period t 
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h
tI  Teacher’s salary in period t 
ta  The lowest ability level among teachers in period t 
th  The lowest human capital level among teachers in period t 
ta  The highest ability level among teachers in period t 
th  The highest human capital level among teachers in period t 
tq  Aggregate teacher quality in period t 
 
 
45 
Chapter 2 
Self-selection, Unions, and Teacher Attrition 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Teacher attrition rates in non-unionized schools are two to three times higher than in 
unionized schools. It would seem that teachers’ unions are the main factor responsible for 
the difference in attrition rates due to the dismissal barriers provided by teachers’ unions. 
In a Bayesian framework with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, I estimate 
how much of the propensity to remain in teaching can be attributed to the effect of 
teachers’ unions rather than the characteristics of individuals who tend to work in 
unionized schools. With the use of the counterfactual, I find that while teachers’ unions 
do lower the attrition rate, most of the difference in attrition rates should be attributed to 
the self-selection into the teaching occupation and not to the barriers to dismissal unions 
provide. 
 
JEL classification: C11; C31; I22; J45 
 
Keywords: Teacher Attrition; Teachers’ Unions; Bayesian Analysis, Causal inference; 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo; Potential outcomes; Roy Model; Treatment effects 
 
 
Equation Section (Next) 
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1.  Introduction 
Teacher attrition rates in unionized and non-unionized schools are distinctly different. 
After the first year of teaching, 8.3% of teachers in unionized schools exit the teaching 
force to pursue a career outside of full-time teaching compared to 16.7% of teachers in 
non-unionized schools (author’s calculations). Teachers’ unions often provide lengthy 
dismissal procedures with mandatory multiple teacher assessments, teachers’ appeals, 
and personal development plans in an effort to improve the teacher’s quality prior to 
dismissal. Non-unionized schools seldom have such constraints and dismiss poor 
performing teachers when required. Thus, it would seem that teachers’ unions account for 
the difference in attrition rates due to the dismissal barriers provided by teachers’ unions. 
 The ways individuals enter into the teaching profession are also distinctly 
different. The majority enter teaching by attending schools of education for a career as a 
teacher in a public, unionized, school. Some choose to enter teaching under provisional 
licensing and emergency certification. Such individuals are under remediation until they 
have satisfied the necessary course requirements and classroom experience to obtain a 
regular teaching certificate. These positions are predominantly in needy inner-city public 
schools where license requirements are demanded by the union. Others choose to enter 
teaching without any formal teaching coursework or classroom experience, and do not 
hold any teacher certifications. These individuals work predominantly in non-unionized 
schools. Given these options, individuals self-select themselves into a certain track. 
 The self-selection process is determined by the type of school which best fits their 
individual preferences and abilities. Administrators in unionized schools are bound by 
collective bargaining contracts which stipulate salary schedules, teacher credential 
requirements, and tenure. Those who desire more job security, or a teaching position 
which relies more on teaching credentials than subject knowledge, may find that 
unionized schools provide more benefits than non-unionized schools. Non-unionized 
schools provide little permanent job security but do provide teachers with individual 
specific salaries and more diverse subject matter. Those who have advanced degrees in 
their subject may prefer to teach in non-unionized schools which unlink their salaries 
from a schedule. Similarly, those with religious preferences or who tend towards more 
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non-traditional learning methods may find that non-unionized schools provide a more 
suitable environment for them than unionized schools. 
 The self-selection process commences by the choice of college track. Individuals 
attending college have opportunities to increase scholastic knowledge or receive teaching 
tools through various majors. An individual’s education path is, for the most part, 
determined by their scholastic ability. Those with lower scholastic scores tend to choose 
an education path which makes them eligible to work in union teaching schools where 
they can earn more under the collective bargaining agreement then under an individual 
based salary. Those with higher scholastic scores tend to choose a scholastic education 
path which provides individual based salaries. If they desire to teach, they tend to do so in 
non-unionized schools where teaching credentials are minimal. 
 The self-selection into teaching also affects an individual’s duration in the 
teaching profession. Teachers who work in public unionized schools must satisfy strict 
entry requirements and, having had previous education courses and classroom 
experiences, are more likely to be better prepared to teach and understand their job 
requirements. They also tend to have degrees from schools of education specializing in 
teaching. Switching professions is costly, as the skills from an education degree are not 
readily transferable to other professions. Non-unionized school teachers have less to lose 
from exiting teaching. By not being required to hold a teaching certification or teaching 
courses, individuals are able to try out teaching while leaving the door open for other 
careers. Thus, the difference in teacher attrition observed in the data may have to do more 
with individuals’ self-selection into teaching than to the barriers to dismissal unions 
provide. 
 The purpose of this paper is to estimate how much of the propensity to remain in 
teaching can be attributed to the effect of teachers’ unions rather than to the 
characteristics of individuals who tend to self-select in unionized schools. I specifically 
investigate the difference in a teacher’s propensity to exit teaching if she teaches in a 
unionized school rather than in a non-unionized school. That is, given individuals’ 
characteristics and preparation are fixed immediately prior to entry into the teaching 
profession, I estimate how much of their propensity to exit teaching is due to teaching in 
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a unionized school for all teachers. A potential outcomes model provides the necessary 
framework to estimate these propensities where Bayesian techniques permit the explicit 
estimation of the counterfactual attrition rates. The empirical strategy is to estimate each 
teacher’s propensity to exit teaching in unionized and non-unionized schools. By 
explicitly calculating each teacher’s propensity to remain teaching in both unionized and 
non-unionized schools, the effect of unions on attrition is empirically available. If an 
individual’s propensities are identical, then unions have no effect and the entire 
propensity to remain in teaching is attributed to individual’s characteristics. If the 
propensities are different, then the difference is attributed to the union. There are many 
characteristics of teachers that are unobservable that influence teachers’ entry and exit 
decisions. This issue is alleviated using a potential outcomes model. This class of models 
account for the correlated decision of entry into teaching and the exit decision. 
 Much of the literature on the teacher labor supply decisions has focused on which 
influences affect unionized public school teacher attrition and, specifically, on the 
decision to exit teaching, with little regard as to how these individuals entered teaching. 
Boyd et al. (2008) study the attrition rate of first year teachers based on the teachers’ 
value-added to student achievement. They find that New York City public school 
teachers from 2000 to 2005, which they identify as less effective at improving test scores, 
have higher attrition rates than more effective teachers. Stinebrickner (2002) using NLS-
72 data finds that the fertility decision is an important determinant of teacher attrition for 
female teachers. Hanushek et al. (2003) find that teacher mobility is related more to 
student characteristics than salary. Ondrich et al. (2005) find teachers with higher salaries 
relative to local nonteaching salaries are less likely to leave teaching. Similar results are 
found in Imazeki (2005). In this paper I focus on both unionized and non-unionized 
schools’ teachers in their first year of teaching when the gap in attrition rates is greatest. 
The first year is also the only year when all teachers in the U.S. have not received tenure.8 
                                                 
8
 Mississippi and North Dakota are exceptions as they only require one year of teaching prior to assessment 
for a continual contract (tenure status). However, in Mississippi, the decision to terminate can be appealed 
at least twice to the chancery and supreme courts (Mississippi Statute 37-9-59). North Dakota doesn’t have 
such appeals. 
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Using teachers’ estimated propensities to exit teaching, I find that 91% of all 
teachers’ exit decision is independent of union status. That is, 91% exit or remain 
teaching regardless of whether they teach in a unionized school or not. 6.4% of all 
teachers remain teaching in unionized schools but exit teaching in non-unionized schools. 
The remaining 3% are more likely to remain teaching in non-unionized schools but exit 
teaching when placed in unionized schools. This provides evidence that the difference in 
teacher attrition observed in the data has more to do with individuals’ self-selection 
process into teaching than with the barriers to dismissal unions provide. Using the 
propensities to exit teaching in probabilities, I estimate that 21% of propensity to remain 
in teaching can be attributed to teachers’ unions while 79% of the propensity to remain in 
teaching is due to the individual characteristics of teachers. Thus, even though unions 
affect the majority of teachers’ propensities to exit teaching, teachers’ decisions to exit 
are not altered enough by unions to explain the difference in attrition rates observed in 
the data. 
 The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 I provide a simple framework to 
analyze teachers’ entry and exit decisions; Section 3 concerns the data; Section 4 lays out 
the empirical model; Section 5 provides results; Section 6 concludes.  Throughout this 
paper I will refer to teachers in unionized school as unionized teachers and similarly 
teachers in non-unionized schools will be referred to as non-unionized teachers.  I do this 
for clarity in exposition. 
 
 
2.  The Determinants of First Year Teachers’ Mobility Decisions 
Hanushek et al. (2003) set up a school choice model which provides a framework for 
analyzing the mobility decisions of established teachers. I extend this framework to 
include the initial decision of entering teaching. Consider the following stylized two 
period occupational choice problem. Individual i  is endowed with scholastic aptitude, 
( )a i , and teaching skills, ( )t i . Assume that all individuals under consideration have at 
least a college eligible level of scholastic aptitude and that individuals know their 
scholastic aptitude but do not fully know their teaching skills. Rather, individual i  forms 
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an expectation of teaching skills. Individual i ’s expectation is ( )iE t  with precision 
var( )it . Teaching skills are defined as the productivity level in teaching. Individuals gain 
knowledge of their teaching skills through classroom experience. 
The first decision is the choice of major. There are two types, one which enhances 
scholastic aptitude and another to improve teaching skills. Individuals must choose only 
one type. The per unit cost is identical. If a scholastic track is chosen, aptitude is 
augmented to '( ) ( )a i a i≥ . If a teaching path is chosen, classroom experience (a 
practicum) augments teaching skills to '( ) ( )t i t i≥ , and are qualified to teach in a 
unionized school. Due to the practicum, those who choose a teaching path during 
education are more informed of their teaching skills, 'var( ) var( )i it t≤ . 
 The second decision is the choice of career. Individuals choose one of three career 
paths: (1) private sector worker, (2) non-union teacher, or (3) union teacher. All 
individuals are eligible to work in the private sector and earn a wage based on their 
scholastic aptitude and working experience. A new private sector worker earns 1( ( ))w a i  
and will earn 2 1( ( )) ( ( ))w a i w a i>  with one period of experience. This reflects the increase 
in wage from gaining experience. Individuals with sufficient scholastic aptitudes, nua , 
can work as teachers in non-unionized schools. New non-unionized teachers earn a wage 
1 1( ) ( ( ))nuw a w a i<  and 2( ( ), ( ))w a i t i  with one period experience. Upon completion of 
non-unionized teachers’ first year, the non-unionized school administrators gain 
knowledge of their teaching skills in transmitting their scholastic ability. The second 
period wages can potentially be higher than second period private sector wages. New 
unionized teachers earn a wage of 1 1( )nuw w a>  as a new teacher and 2w  in the second 
period. The higher wage reflects the pre-screening taken place to ensure some teaching 
quality and that an additional skill component adds value to these workers. Unionized 
teachers are screened prior to placement and only those individuals with sufficient 
teaching skills, ut , can work as unionized school teachers. 
 After education is obtained, individual i  chooses an occupation, *d , from among 
the feasible opportunities in order to maximize the present value of expected utility: 
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where { }d  is the set of eligible occupations, ( )dX i  are the job characteristics including 
working conditions and wages of job d , ( )Z i  captures individual factors, and L  are 
government policies regarding teachers’ unions. At the end of the first period, all teachers 
update their knowledge of teaching skills based on their position. At the beginning of the 
second period, individuals have an opportunity to choose whether to remain at their 
current position or switch. 
 I first analyze the education and occupation decisions and then discuss the 
mobility decision. For clarity, I analyze the problem by aptitude level and expectation of 
teaching skills. First, those of low aptitude and expected low teaching skills work in the 
private sector as they are ineligible for teaching in either a unionized or non-unionized 
school. These individuals choose a scholastic non-teaching path for schooling. Second, 
those who have pre-screened teaching skills above ut , but low aptitude, qualify for 
unionized school teaching or private sector employment. All choose a teaching path for 
schooling and unionized school teaching for employment, as this will offer them higher 
salary than private sector employment. Third, as aptitude rises, individuals have two or 
three occupational choices depending on expected teaching skills. These individuals’ 
education/occupational decisions are more complex. Those with low teaching skills and 
who are quite precise in their expectations forgo teaching in non-unionized schools and 
teach in a unionized school. This is because second period non-unionized teaching 
salaries are determined by scholastic ability and teaching skills. Individuals choose a 
teaching path for education. If individuals’ expectation of teaching skills has a low 
precision, then they teach in a non-unionized school in the first period and choose a 
scholastic path instead of a teaching path for education to insure against incorrect 
expectations. If their realization of teaching skills after the first period is lower than 
expected, they can earn more in the private sector in the second period, having 
augmented their scholastic ability in school. Lastly, those with the highest ability choose 
between non-unionized teaching and private sector employment. All of these individuals 
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choose a scholastic path for education and only work as non-unionized teaching if their 
expectations on their teaching skills are high. 
 Now consider individuals who have completed their first year of teaching and 
have updated their beliefs on the characteristics of teaching jobs. Individuals may also 
have had personal changes in their lives which can affect their job switching. Let 
individual i  have job switching costs from current job to a new job be dc  for job 
opportunity d . The individual will switch jobs if the expected utility gain is sufficient to 
overcome the cost. 
 There are several costs to switching jobs. These costs depend on the education 
path chosen and on whether the individuals were able to update their expectations on 
their teaching skills. That is, their expectations on teaching skills are dependent on the 
teaching experience during that year. These updates are not uniform across all teachers, 
as each school and classroom provides different experiences. Once these expectations are 
updated, an individual can calculate the costs of job switching. I analyze the switching 
costs by educational path and occupation chosen during the first period. If an individual 
chooses a scholastic path and a private sector career, then switching costs are similar to 
that of the first period but with a higher private sector wage. This is because private 
sector workers’ expectations of teaching skills remain the same, i.e., they are not updated. 
If an individual chooses a scholastic path and a non-unionized teaching position, then 
switching costs are dependent on the individual’s updated expectations on teaching jobs. 
If expectations change substantially then, depending on which way they change, they 
either reinforce the initial occupational decision or provide disincentives to remain in 
teaching. When updated expectations are such that teaching is worse than expected, 
individuals have low or even negative switching costs. If an individual chooses unionized 
teaching, then the switching costs are greater than non-unionized teachers. This is due to 
two reasons: 1) their scholastic aptitude was not augmented during schooling and as such, 
if they work in the private sector, they will earn lower salaries; 2) unionized school 
teaching salaries are not directly linked to scholastic ability or teaching skills while 
switching to a new occupation would link their pay to scholastic ability. 
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 There are other costs an individual considers when deciding to switch careers. 
Some include changes in school personnel policies and working conditions, dX , changes 
in the individual’s characteristics, ( )Z i , and changes in government policies regarding 
teachers’ unions, L . I discuss these in more depth below. 
 School administrators may change an individual’s teaching load, the courses to be 
taught, or even the location where they will be teaching the following year. These may 
have profound influences on an individual’s decision to remain in teaching. Measuring 
teachers’ salaries also poses a problem. Depending on the length of year and 
extracurricular activity involvement, salaries may be quite different; without a standard 
measure across teachers. To address this, I assume individuals choose employment based 
on the total salary. That is, they choose between jobs which package a total salary for 
certain duties. This seems quite intuitive as many prospective new teachers can’t a la 
carte their working conditions. Working conditions also include standard measures such 
as class size and type of teaching assignment. To address general working conditions, I 
also control for the type of school, religious affiliation held, and the level of the school 
the teacher works in. Community characteristics may also play an important role. Those 
set in the rural versus urban may find it difficult to retain teachers, as teachers may desire 
to work in more affluent communities and be less likely to leave upon receipt of such an 
assignment. Furthermore, educated communities may provide more support as well as 
better working conditions for teachers. 
 Teacher’s preferences also play a role in a teacher’s decision to switch jobs. 
Marriage and children may influence individuals’ decisions. This seems quite plausible 
since many teachers exit the work force to care for family, as discussed above. Teachers’ 
safety may also play an important role. Some individuals may have aspirations to change 
the world and choose a school where they feel they can do the most good. These 
aspirations may be outweighed by the reality of their personal safety once they are 
attacked or threatened that they will be attacked. Type of education may also influence an 
individuals’ mobility decision. Those with a strict Bachelor’s degree in education may 
find that their outside options are limited, as the private sector doesn’t value teachings 
skills as much as the skills other degrees offer. 
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 State legislation regarding teachers’ unions can affect an individual’s decision to 
join a teachers’ union. If a state does not require a union, then individuals are more 
inclined to choose a scholastic path since, if their expectations on teachings skills are 
incorrect, they can earn a higher salary in the second period. I use state legislation 
regarding collective bargaining laws to identify individuals’ decisions to enter a 
unionized school versus entering a non-unionized school. 
 
 
3.  The Data 
The main data source is the restricted-access Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) years 
2000-01 and 2004-05. Each TFS consists of two questionnaires, one for current teachers 
and one for former teachers. The TFS consists of a sample of teachers from the Schools 
and Staffing Survey (SASS) from the previous year. The TFS primary design is to 
measure attrition and provide comparisons on teachers on many different dimensions 
who left the teaching profession, teachers who moved to another school, and those who 
stayed in the same school. It also contains current economic activities of recently exited 
teachers. I also use community characteristic data from the U.S. Census and other 
ancillary datasets. Appendix A describes the dataset construction, the variable link 
between the TFS datasets, and also contains the restrictions placed on variables. 
 The final data set consists of 1080 full-time regular first year teachers. There are 
467 unionized teachers and 613 non-unionized teachers. Applying the sampling weights, 
the weighted observations are 215,760 unionized teachers and 99,368 non-unionized 
teachers. Included in the non-unionized teachers are a significant portion of public school 
teachers who identify themselves as not being a member of a teachers’ union. Table A3 in 
Appendix A contains the full descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. 
 The sample consists of 75% females with the average age being 29 years old. 
82% of the sample is non-hispanic white, and a little less than half are currently married. 
The average number of children per teacher who are under the age of 5 is .33, and half 
the teachers live in households with incomes above $50,000. Few teachers have outside 
jobs during the school year, with this being less so for non-unionized school teachers. 
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The average class size is 15 in non-unionized schools, with one additional student per 
class in unionized schools. 10% of all first year teachers reported they were either 
threatened or attacked over the previous year, with more unionized teachers being 
threatened/attacked than non-unionized teachers. 91% of unionized teachers had a teacher 
practicum, compared with 76% of non-unionized teachers. Non-unionized teachers have 
higher ACT scores and are more likely to teach math or science. Roughly half of all first 
year teachers were previously unemployed prior to accepting a position in teaching. 
Charter schools are 5 times more likely to be non-unionized. Lastly, 77% of all unionized 
teachers have undergraduate degrees in states which require collective bargaining 
contracts, compared to 56% of non-unionized teachers. 
 There are two dependent variables in the analysis, one for the treatment equation: 
being a member of a teacher’s union; and one for the outcomes equations: the exiting 
decision of teachers. They are both limited-dependent variables. Overall, the weighted 
sample consists of 68.5% unionized school teachers. The mobility decisions of teachers 
are displayed in Table 1. Most teachers remain as full-time teachers at the same school 
where they taught the previous school year. Those who switch to a new school, and 
continue on as full-time teachers, did so at the same rate regardless of union 
membership.9 The difference in mobility between unionized and non-unionized teachers 
is apparent in those who left teaching. Non-unionized teachers exit the profession at twice 
the rate of unionized teachers. 
 
Union Non-Union
Teaching at the Same School 78.6 69.0
Teaching at a New School 13.1 14.3
No Longer Teaching 8.3 16.7
Footnotes
1: In percent.
2: Weighted observations
Table 1: Mobility Rates Among Teachers With 1 Year 
Experience1,2
Source: TFS 2004-05 (STTUS_TF, TFSFINWT ) and TFS 2000-01 (STATUS, 
TFSFINWT)
 
 
                                                 
9
 This is robust across the teacher experience profile. 
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 Some of the difference in teacher attrition may be attributed to the difference in 
barriers to dismissal. Table 2 provides a snapshot of different barriers and to what extent 
they are problematic for administrators at unionized and non-unionized schools. The 
barriers to dismissal are roughly three to four times higher for unionized schools than 
non-unionized. For example, 76% of all unionized school principals indicated that tenure 
was a barrier to dismiss inadequate or poor teachers compared to 16% of non-unionized 
school principals. 
 
Union Non-union
Tenure 76 16
Teachers' Associations 69 0
Inadequate Documentation 51 27
Personnel policies 52 19
Dismissal is too stressful and uncomfortable 25 16
Termination decisions not upheld 24 7
              SASS 1999-00 (A0174-A0179, D0497, S0497, AFNLWGT)
Table 2: Schools' Barriers to Dismissal of Teachers1,2
Source: SASS 2003-04 (A0152-A0159, D0094, AFNLWGT)
Footnotes
1: In Percent
2: Weighted Principal level obsevations
 
 
The degree of barriers to dismissal also vary from state to state for public unionized 
schools.10 Most states require two evaluations prior to commencing the dismissal process. 
These may be six months to one year apart. Teachers receiving poor evaluations can 
appeal the actual evaluation or receive leniency given through collective bargaining 
agreements. For instance, in North Carolina, teachers on remediation are placed on a 
year-long summative evaluation process with remediation (North Carolina Department of 
Public Instruction, TPAI Fact and Summary Sheet). In Georgia, the decision to terminate 
a teacher may be appealed at least twice to the state board and to the superior court of the 
county (Georgia Code 20-2-1160). In Massachusetts, if a provisional teacher's 
performance is deemed insufficient, the teacher may enter a district training program 
prior to receiving tenure (Massachusetts General Law Title XII, ch. 71, sec. 38). 
                                                 
10
 The TR3 database constructed by the National Center on Teacher Quality contains state level legislation 
on barriers to dismissal. 
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Similarly, Louisiana exempts provisional teachers from evaluations while participating in 
the Louisiana Teacher and Assessment Program (State BP title 28, Part CIII, Bulletin 
1525, Ch 3, #345). Furthermore, some teacher terminations are not upheld by senior 
administrators or administrators may extend a teachers’ contract if their evaluations are 
unacceptable. In Ohio, the superintendent can make a one-time only recommendation for 
extension of the probationary term up to 2 years (Ohio Revised Code  3319.11 (C)(1)). 
 Table 3 displays the most important reasons teachers indicated in deciding to exit 
after their first year of teaching. 27.9% of unionized teachers versus 30.4% of non-
unionized former teachers left due to outside opportunities while 22.7% of unionized 
versus 19% of non-unionized former teachers left due to school staffing actions. 19% of 
unionized versus 26% of non-unionized former teachers left due to personal reasons. 
 
Union Non-Union
Teaching Job Expectations
   Dissatisfied with Teaching as a Career 15.4 11.4
   Dissatsified with Teaching Assignment 14.4 4.6
Outside Opportunities
   For Better Salary 23.1 19.8
   To Pursue position outside of K-12 Teaching 4.8 10.6
Personnel Policies
   School Staffing Action 22.7 19.0
Personal Reasons
   Child Rearing --- 12.8
   Schooling (in education) 8.7 1.4
   Schooling (outside of education) --- 8.8
   Health 8.1 0.4
   Personal Reasons 2.2 2.7
Footnotes
1: Weighted observations.
Table 3: Most Important Reason Why Teacher Says They Leave
Source: TFS 2004-05 (f0579)
 
 
 While Table 3 indicates why teachers left, it does not provide any substantial 
proof that unions have any impact on teachers’ decisions to exit teaching. To more fully 
understand the outside opportunities for teachers, I analyze the careers chosen by former 
teachers and present the results in Table 4. The occupational paths chosen by former 
teachers are quite different between former unionized and non-unionized teachers. 43% 
of former unionized teachers remain in the education field with almost all of them 
working as general staff. This is compared to 20.5% of non-unionized former teachers 
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who remain in the education field. The proportion of former teachers who work outside 
of the education field is quite similar between unionized and non-unionized teachers, 
30% of former unionized teachers versus 36% of former non-unionized teachers and 
these working predominantly as office and administrative support. 20% of former 
unionized teachers choose to exit the labor force compared to 23% of non-unionized. 
Interestingly, 8% of unionized and 21% of non-unionized classified themselves as 
unemployed. 
 
Union Non-Union
Occupations Inside of Education 42.9 20.5
   General Staff3 30.7 20.1
   Administrator4 0.0 0.2
   Guidance Councilor 12.2 0.2
Occupations Outside of Education5 30.2 36.1
   Office and administrative support occupations 10.2 5.8
   Computer and mathematical science occupations 3.9 4.5
   Business and financial operations occupations 2.8 5.7
   Sales and related occupations 4.9 3.4
   Management occupations 0.0 4.1
   Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations 1.8 2.0
   Community and social service occupations 2.9 0.5
   Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations 0.0 2.4
   Healthcare practitioner and technical occupations 0.0 2.2
   Healthcare support occupations 1.0 0.8
Not in the Labor Force 20.0 22.9
   Caring for Family Member 0.7 8.1
   Student 18.7 14.7
   Retired 0.2 0.0
   Disabled 0.4 0.0
Unemployed 7.3 21.0
Source: TFS 2004-05 (OCODE_TF F0553 F5556  TFSFINWT), TFS 2000-01 (F0053 F5055 TFSFINWT)
Footnotes
1: In percent.
2: Weighted observations.
3: General staff include teachers' assistants, secratraries, bus drivers, janatorial staff, and other non-teaching positions.
4: Administrators include deans, principals, assistant and vice principals, and supervisory staff.
5: Occupations  are classified by 2002 NAICS Occupation Codes.
Table 4: Occupational Status of Former Teachers With 1 Year Experience1,2
 
 
 Table 5 contains the average earnings of former first year teachers when they 
were teachers and then for their new occupations. Former union teachers make $5,623 
more than former non-union teachers in the teaching profession. In their new 
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occupations, earnings are roughly the same between union and non-union teachers at 
$32,000. Thus, former union teachers’ earnings remain roughly the same, while former 
non-union teachers’ earnings rise substantially. 
 
Union Non-Union Difference
Previous Year's Earnings (As a Teacher) 32,969 27,346 5,623
Current Year's Earnings (New Occupation) 32,665 31,790 875
   Difference In Earnings -304 4,444
Lowest Salary to Return to Teaching 33,916 35,999 -2,084
   Difference In Earnings As a Teacher 946 8,653
Footnotes
1: In 2004 dollars.
2: Excludes unemployed or not in labor force.
3: Weighted observations.
Table 5: Average Earnings of Former First Year Teachers1,2,3
Source: TFS 2004-05 (earnsch, F0559, F0612), TFS 2000-01 (earnsch, F0058), and BEA GDP Deflator
 
 
Former non-union teachers have a higher reservation wage to return to teaching, 
as indicated in their lowest salary to return to teaching. That is, non-unionized teachers 
require a raise of $8,653 to enter back into teaching, compared to former unionized 
teachers requiring a salary raise of $946 to enter back into teaching. Even though these 
individuals may overvalue their teaching skills to what the market would bear, the non-
union teachers’ reservation wage being over $4000 above that which they make in the 
private sector indicates that they prefer private sector work. 
 Comparing teachers who remain in teaching with those who exit, both unionized 
and non-unionized teachers who remain in teaching make roughly $2,500 more than 
those who exit. This indicates that earnings may partially explain why both union and 
non-union teachers leave. If the pay distribution across non-union schools is more 
disburse than non-unionized pay, then it is possible that the higher attrition rate is due 
solely to the pay disparity. Union schools are less likely to have a high pay disparity since 
unions bargain for collective wages across larger pools of teachers. After the first year, 
salaries between union and non-union teachers converge with non-unions teachers 
gaining $648 while the union teachers lose $426. Signing bonuses and other perks to 
entice highly demanded teachers into union schools may explain why they drop in salary. 
This pattern continues over the experience profile. 
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Union Non-Union Difference
First Year Earnings 35,602 29,940 5,662
Second Year Earnings 35,176 30,588 4,588
Difference in Earnings -426 648
Footnotes
1: In 2004 dollars.
2: Weighted observations.
Source: TFS 2004-05 (earnsch, earsn_tf), TFS 2000-01 (earnsch, earnsc_t), and BEA GDP Deflator
Table 6: Average Earnings of First Year Teachers Who Remain 
Teaching In Their Second Year1,2
 
 
 When analyzing first year teachers’ pay, it is important to recognize that unions 
pay more due to an initial screening of teaching skills. Union teachers have a higher 
proportion of teachers who hold teacher certification. This screens poor teachers from 
entering into teaching, only to be dismissed after the first year. 
 
Remain in 
Teaching
Exit 
Teaching
Remain in 
Teaching
Exit 
Teaching
Regular License 59.5 46.2 45.9 45.1
Probationary Certificate 17.9 18.9 25.2 5.2
Provisonal License 12.5 26.0 16.1 16.3
Temporary, Waiver, or No Certification 10.1 9.0 12.7 33.4
Footnotes
1: Weighted observations
Table 7: Certification Type by Union Status and Mobility Decision of First Year 
Teachers1
Union Non-Union
Source: TFS 2004-05 (T0443, T0166, TFSFINWT ) and TFS 2000-01 (T0104, TFSFINWT)
 
 
Table 7 contains certification types of first year teachers by union status and 
mobility decision. The data suggests that requiring a teacher practicum for union teachers 
lowers the attrition rate, since it serves both the prospective teacher and potential 
employers. In-class experience aids the prospective teacher in understanding if teaching 
is a desired career. Potential employers are provided with a screening mechanism for 
teacher quality. For unionized teachers, 59.5% of those teachers who remained had a 
regular license compared to 46.2% who exited. Non-union teachers who remained or left 
were equally likely to hold a regular license. This suggests that obtaining a teaching 
license in a non-union position isn’t a factor of attrition. 
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 Teachers’ prospects of returning to teaching are found in Table 8. 30% of 
unionized and non-unionized former teachers indicate that they would return the 
following year if they returned at all. However, 42.1% of former unionized teachers are 
undecided compared to 23.3% of former non-unionized teachers. It should be noted that 
the category never was excluded from the choices provided to teachers surveyed. Thus, 
the undecided category could indicate that former teachers are indicating they don’t have 
a set date of returning or they will never return to teaching. 
 
Union Non-Union
Later This School Year 13.2 6.3
Next School Year 29.0 30.6
In Less Than Five Years 13.2 30.7
After Five Years 2.6 9.1
Undecided 42.1 23.3
Footnotes
1: Weighted observations.
Table 8: Expected Return Date of Former Teachers1
Source: TFS 2004-05 (f0613) and TFS 2000-01 (f0613)
 
 
 
4.  The Model 
The modified potential outcomes model is an extension of the Roy (1951) model. This 
framework allows the explicit modeling of the counterfactual state – the outcome that 
would have been observed had the individual made a different treatment decision. This 
class of models has seen considerable use in the program evaluation literature, where the 
goal is to determine the effectiveness of a program or treatment when individuals are not 
randomly assigned into the treated or untreated states.11 I develop a parametric model to 
allow endogenous selectivity to investigate the impact of teaching in a unionized school, 
denoted D on the observed mobility outcome, denoted 0y =  for staying at current school 
                                                 
11
 In recent years, Bayesian techniques in this literature have grown immensely with the works of 
Vijverberg (1993), Koop and Poirier (1997), Li (1998), Chib and Hamilton (2000, 2002), Poirer and Tobias 
(2003) and Li, Poirier and Tobias (2004). 
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and 1y =  for exiting teaching.12 I let 1y  denote the outcome received by the individual in 
the treatment state and 0y  denote the outcome received without treatment. The variables 
1 0 and y y  are outcomes variables and represent either observed or potential outcomes. 
When 1,d =  the teacher works in a unionized school and thus her ‘treated’ mobility 
outcomes 1y  is observed. Conversely, when 0,d = the teacher works in a nonunionized 
school, and thus her untreated mobility outcome 0y  is observed. The observable 
conditions for teacher i  are 
 1 0
  if d 1    if d 1
 and  .
   if d 0    if 0 
i i i
i i
i i i
y
y y
y d
= − = 
= = 
− = = 
 (1) 
Since only one outcome is ever observed for any individual, these conditions summarize 
the observed outcomes for teacher i  by the following 
 1 0(1 ) .i i i i iy d y d y= + −  (2) 
There are n  observations with 1n  of them in the treated group and 0 1n n n= −  of them in 
the non-treated group. Reordering and stacking observations, (1) can be written as 
 
1 1
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
, ,
miss
n n
miss
n n
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
  
= =   
      
 (3) 
1n×  vectors where 
1 01 0n
 and YnY  are observed outcomes and 0 11 0 and Y
miss miss
n nY  are potential 
or missing outcomes. The observed treatment decisions d  and the observed and potential 
outcomes 1y  and 0y  are generated by an underlying latent variable representation of the 
model.  The binary treatment indicator, id , is related to the latent *id  as follows: 
 
*( 0) [ ]i i iD id I d I Wε γ= > = > −  (4) 
with ( )I ⋅  denoting the standard indicator function equal to one if the event is true and to 
zero otherwise. Stacking observations, the treatment variable in (4) can be written as 
                                                 
12
 There is no assumed ordering among the alternatives. See Li and Tobias (2008) for ordered potential 
outcomes model specification. 
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1
0
1
,
0
n
n
D
 
=  
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 (5) 
a 1n×  vector. Similarly, the treated latent variable can be written as 
 
1
0
*
*
*
,
n
n
d
D
d
 
=  
  
 (6) 
a 1n×  vector. Similar, I introduce independent unobservable latent variables * *1 0 and yi iy  
related to the outcome variables 1 0 and i iy y  as follows: 
 
*( 0) [ ]   for 1,0ij ij ij i jy I y I X jε β= > = > − =  (7) 
with ( )I ⋅  again denoting the indicator function. Reordering the observations, the latent 
variables in (7) can be stacked as 
 
11
0
**
01* *
1 0 **
01 0
, ,
miss
nn
miss
nn
yy
Y Y
yy
  
= =   
      
 (8) 
with similar dimensions and interpretation as 1Y  and 0Y . 
Figure 1 displays an individual’s propensity to remain or exit measured in latent 
outcome for individual i , *iy . When 0iy = , this corresponds to a latent propensity * 0iy <  
and when 1iy = , this corresponds to a latent propensity * 0iy > . The point representing 
indifference in the decision to remaining or exiting teaching is * 0iy = . As an individual’s 
propensity to exit increases (decreases), the corresponding value of *y  increases 
(decreases). Similarly, as an individual’s propensity to remain increases (decreases), the 
corresponding value of *iy  decreases (increases). The probability of exiting teaching is 
the area under the curve to the right of being indifferent. Thus, it is expected that the 
distribution of exiting teaching in a unionized schools is to the left of the non-unionized 
schools for the majority of individuals. 
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Figure 1: An Individual’s Propensity to Exit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Type 5 Tobit (see Amemiya (1984)) model is expressed in the five-equation 
system: 
 
*
   DD Wγ ε= +  (9) 
 
*
1 1 1Y X β ε= +  (10) 
 
*
0 0 0Y X β ε= +  (11) 
with equations (4) and (7) completing the system. Equations (10) and (11) are the 
mobility outcome equations in the treated and untreated states, respectively. The matrix 
W is ,Dn k×  γ  is 1,Dk ×  X  is ,n k×  jβ  is 1k ×  ( 1,0),j =  and the error terms are of the 
dimensions of the dependent variables as specified above.13 I assume the availability of 
some exclusion restriction or instrument, i.e., some covariates which enters W  that is not 
contained in X .14 
I make the following joint normality assumption of the error terms (writing only 
the lower triangular portion of Σ  for notational simplicity): 
                                                 
13
 I assume that the same set of covariates appear in the treated and untreated states. This assumption is not 
necessary but reasonable for this estimation process. 
14
 Li and Tobias (2008) point out that if the observed Di is an element of xi, then this would be of the form 
of a standard treatment or causal effect model that only works with observed rather than potential outcomes 
(See Maddala (1983) for further elaboration into this class of models). 
*
iy <0 
(Remain) 
*
iy = 0 
(Indifferent) 
*
iy >0 
(Exit) 
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 (12) 
or 
 | , (0, ).iidi i iX W Nε ≡ Σ:  (13) 
where Σ  is a positive definite matrix. The variance parameters have been normalized to 
unity for identification purposes since the scale of the latent variables are indeterminate. 
In the following, I impose this condition through the prior. 
The primary problem when estimating the causal effect is one of unobserved 
confounding, whereby unobservable characteristics of the individual not captured in the 
model are correlated with both the treatment decision (denoted D ) and the outcome of 
interest (denoted y ) due to some unmodeled subject-specific factors. The presence of the 
correlation/covariance terms 1 0 and D Dσ σ  are added to account for the potential of 
confounding on unobservables. 
 
4.1.  The Likelihood 
Given the assumed conditional independence across observations, I can write the 
likelihood function for this model as: 
* *
1 0
{ : 1} { : 0}
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* * * *
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0
* * * *
1 1 0 00{ : 1} {
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∏ ∏
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∏ ∫ ∫
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∏
where [ , ]βΓ = Σ . The conditional and marginal densities in these expressions can be 
determined from the assumed normality of the error vector. For example, 
 
*
1 1
1 1
Pr( , 1| ) Pr( 0, | , , )
Pr( , | , , )
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
y y d y w w x
x w w x
µ γ
ε β µ γ
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Performing the required calculations, I obtain 
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where 
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 (15) 
and ( )φ ⋅  denotes the standard normal density. 
Note that the correlation parameter 10σ does not enter this likelihood function, and 
thus it is not identified. This parameter describes the correlation between outcomes 
across regimes. The reason is that the pair of outcomes 1 0( , )y y  are never observed for 
any individual, and thus, the correlation between these two outcomes will not enter the 
density function for the observed data (this is quite apparent from eq. (3)). 
As shown in Vijverberg (1993), Koop and Poirier (1997), Poirier and Tobias 
(2003), and Li, Poirier, and Tobias (2003), the positive definiteness of the 3x3 covariance 
matrix serves to place bounds on 10σ . These bounds imply that, conditionally, 
 10 10 10 ,σ σ σ≤ ≤  
where 
 
2 2
10 1 0 1 0[(1 )(1 )]D D D Dσ σ σ σ σ= − − −  
and 
 
2 2
10 1 0 1 0[(1 )(1 )].D D D Dσ σ σ σ σ= − − −  
It should be apparent that these are only functions of identified correlation parameters. 
Information learned on these parameters spills over and serves to update beliefs about the 
non-identified correlation parameter via the enforced positive definiteness of .Σ  
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4.2.  Bayesian Estimation 
Instead of direct evaluation of this posterior, modern Bayesian empirical work makes use 
of recent advances in simulation methods to carry out a posterior analysis. One 
simulation device in particular is the Gibbs sampler. This algorithm solves the problem of 
calculating the posterior moments, quantiles, marginal densities and other quantities of 
interest by first obtaining a set of draws from the posterior ( | , ).p y DΓ  The posterior is 
obtained by generating a sequence of draws that converge to this distribution. Once 
convergence has been achieved, the subsequent set of simulated parameters values can be 
used to calculate the desired quantities. In the Gibbs sampler, a Markov Chain whose 
limiting distribution is ( | , )p y DΓ  is produced by iteratively sampling from the complete 
posterior conditionals of the model. In this model, I use well-known diffused priors that 
can easily be sampled from. 
 I use data augmentation (Tanner and Wong (1987) and Albert and Chib (1993)) in 
conjunction with the Gibbs sampler. When data augmentation is used, the posterior is 
first expanded to include not only the parameter vector Γ , but also the latent data 
* * *
1 0, y , and yD . Data augmentation in conjunction with the Gibb sampler simplifies the 
required posterior calculation since conditioned on the latent data, inference regarding the 
regression parameters proceeds similarly one with a continuous dependent variable. 
Given the regression parameters, it is straightforward to obtain draws from the posterior 
conditional for the latent data. 
 For the model, this augmented posterior is of the form: 
 
* * * * * *
1 0 1 0
* * * * * *
1 0 1 0
( , , , | , ) ( , , , , , )
( , | , , , ) ( , , | ) ( )
p D y y y D p y D D y y
p y D D y y p D y y p
Γ ∝ Γ
= Γ Γ Γ
 (16) 
with ( )p Γ  denoting the prior for the parameters of the model. The first term, conditioned 
on the latent variables and model parameters, the observed responses  and yD  are known 
with certainty and thus the joint (conditional) distribution of D and y  is degenerate. The 
middle term expresses the known trivariate normal density given the joint normality 
assumption (12). Using the assumed conditional independence across observations, I can 
rewrite the augmented posterior as follows: 
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3( ; , )xφ µ Ω  denotes a trivariate normal density with mean 1 0[ , , ]W X Xµ γ β β= , and 
covariance matrix Ω .15 
 I specify priors of the form 
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with diffused values 
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I provide full details on the posterior simulator in Appendix B along with a data 
generated simulation to demonstrate the performance of the posterior simulator. The 
sampling is performed using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm and cycles through 
the steps until convergence. The post convergence draws are used to produce the 
posterior distribution. 
 
4.3.  Treatment Effects 
In this section I follow Poirier and Tobias (2003) to derive expression for conventional 
treatment effects for the outcome responses model. In particular, I adapt a conventional 
                                                 
15
 Conditional on the latent variables, the model is a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model except 
for the restriction that (1, 1) element of the covariance matrix is fixed at one. 
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treatment parameter of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) to the response model, and 
describe how it can be calculated within this framework. 
 The ATE typically quantifies the expected outcome gain for a randomly selected 
individual. Given the observed data iD  and iy , I define the individual level gain from 
receiving treatment as 
 
* *
1 1.i i iy y∆ = −  (19) 
Given definition (19), I characterize the following sampling distribution: 
 
[ ] : ( | , )ATE p X∆ Γ
 (20) 
I am interested in characterizing the posterior predictive distributions of the outcome 
gains. That is, I integrate out the parameters Γ  from the densities (20) by averaging over 
the appropriate posterior distribution of those parameters. For the ATE, I would like to 
obtain 
 ( | , data) ( | , , data) ( | data)
R
p X p X p d
Γ
∆ = ∆ Γ Γ Γ∫  
To characterize the densities in (20), I define the following parameter: 
 1 102(1 ).δ σ= −  
Given the joint normality assumption, the following expression for (20) can be derived as 
follows 
 
1 0 1
1/2 1 0
1
1
[ ] : ( | , ) ( ; ( ), )
( )
n
ATE p X p X
X
β β δ
β β
δ φ
δ
−
∆ Γ = ∆ −
 ∆ − −
=   
 
 
where ∆ has a normal distribution with mean 1 2( )X β β−  and variance 1δ . Figure 2 
depicts an individual’s treatment effect measured in the probability to exit teaching from 
a unionized school and from a non-unionized school. In the figure, both *1( )ip y  and 
*
0( )ip y  are less than .5, which implies that this individual is more likely to remain in 
teaching in both unionized and non-unionized schools. *1( )ip y  < *0( )ip y  implies that this 
individual is more likely to remain teaching in unionized schools than in non-unionized 
schools. 
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Figure 2: Union Effect on Teacher Attrition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Results 
I run the Gibbs Sampler for 60,000 iterations and discard the first 10,000 of these as the 
burn-ins and construct the posterior distribution from every 50th draw. Convergence is 
tested using Geweke’s Separated Partial Means (GSPM) test. For all sets of coefficients, I 
provide the mean posterior estimate on each coefficient along with the posterior standard 
deviation for the estimate. I also provide the probability of being greater than 0 for all 
coefficients. This gives an indication of how far from 0 the coefficient actually is. 
 Table 9 displays the marginal effects for the treatment equation: those who enter a 
teachers’ union. I highlight the most interesting results. First, teachers who earn their 
undergraduate degree in a state that have laws requiring collective bargaining in public 
schools are 15% more likely to enter a union then state without such laws. Secondly, 
those who participate in a teacher practicum are 20% more likely to enter union. This 
may be due to school of education graduates receiving practicum prior to entering 
teaching in a unionized school. It may also be due to teachers gaining in-school 
experience which makes them tend to favor unions. Third, those in households with 
income higher than $50,000 are 8% more likely to enter teacher unions. Lastly, 
individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics do not seem to influence an individual’s 
decision to enter a union.  
 
p(∆i) 
p( *1iy ) p( *0iy ) 
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Variable Post mean Post std. Pr( • > 0 | Data)
   Constant -1.018 0.222 0.00
   Gender -0.020 0.041 0.26
   Age -0.002 0.003 0.21
   Non-White 0.025 0.045 0.59
   Married -0.001 0.040 0.40
   ACT Score -0.001 0.008 0.37
   BA in Education 0.027 0.043 0.61
   BA in Math / Science 0.089 0.070 0.75
   Advanced Degree -0.066 0.054 0.08
   Not In Labor Force Last Year 0.043 0.037 0.74
   Dependents under 5 -0.053 0.035 0.05
   Household Income1 0.082 0.037 0.82
   Outside Teaching Job 0.057 0.067 0.68
   Outside Non-Teaching Job 0.019 0.049 0.55
   Class Size 0.010 0.004 0.83
   Teacher Practicum 0.196 0.053 0.83
   Special Education Assignment -0.128 0.061 0.02
   Math & Science Assignment -0.100 0.063 0.05
   School Related Earnings11 0.022 0.003 0.83
   Charter School -0.581 0.061 0.00
   Religious -0.643 0.063 0.00
   Elementary School 0.028 0.042 0.63
   Middle School 0.185 0.058 0.83
   Urban 0.033 0.045 0.64
   % with BA or higher in community -0.006 0.002 0.00
   Median Household Income in community11 0.003 0.001 0.81
   State Requires Collective Bargaining 0.147 0.038 0.83
Correlations
   ρD1 0.037 0.043
   ρD0 0.035 0.049
   ρ10 0.031 0.045
Table 9: Marginal Effects From Treatment Equation (Joining a Union) and 
Correlation Estimates
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Variable Post 
mean
Post 
std. Pr(•>0|Data)
Post 
mean
Post 
std. Pr(•> 0|Data)
   Constant -0.246 0.172 0.057 0.140 0.232 0.602
   Gender 0.017 0.029 0.608 -0.013 0.042 0.308
   Age 0.004 0.002 0.823 -0.001 0.003 0.296
   Non-White 0.009 0.034 0.498 0.014 0.049 0.521
   Married 0.000 0.031 0.407 0.036 0.042 0.673
   ACT Score 0.008 0.006 0.761 0.005 0.008 0.603
   BA in Education -0.020 0.032 0.203 -0.039 0.045 0.160
   BA in Math / Science 0.048 0.051 0.699 0.052 0.063 0.671
   Advanced Degree 0.023 0.039 0.611 -0.025 0.053 0.258
   Not In Labor Force Last Year 0.010 0.029 0.536 -0.066 0.038 0.036
   Dependents under 5 0.011 0.026 0.559 0.039 0.034 0.723
   Household Income1 -0.012 0.029 0.274 0.063 0.042 0.780
   Outside Teaching Job -0.011 0.052 0.350 -0.001 0.068 0.414
   Outside Non-Teaching Job 0.025 0.035 0.639 0.093 0.050 0.805
   Class Size 0.004 0.003 0.758 -0.007 0.004 0.036
   Attacked or Threatened 0.103 0.037 0.833 0.043 0.065 0.607
   Teacher Practicum -0.079 0.044 0.017 -0.142 0.043 0.001
   Special Education Assignment -0.005 0.046 0.381 -0.092 0.079 0.097
   Math & Science Assignment -0.056 0.048 0.091 0.011 0.056 0.476
   School Related Earnings11 -0.006 0.003 0.010 -0.007 0.003 0.013
   Charter School -0.046 0.079 0.229 0.032 0.053 0.599
   Religious -0.076 0.087 0.151 -0.006 0.049 0.378
   Elementary School -0.096 0.038 0.002 -0.008 0.044 0.350
   Middle School 0.059 0.034 0.807 0.031 0.077 0.549
   Urban -0.016 0.033 0.244 0.021 0.050 0.542
   % with BA or higher 0.002 0.001 0.774 0.001 0.002 0.507
   Median Household Income11 -0.001 0.001 0.056 -0.001 0.001 0.256
Non-Union TeachersUnion Teachers
Table 10: Marginal Effects of Outcome Equations (Exiting Decision)
 
 
 Table 10 contains the marginal effects for the potential outcomes equations. There 
are no individual physical or family structure characteristics that pinpoint which teachers 
are more likely to leave. Age, gender, race, marital status, and scholastic aptitude do not 
explain which teachers are more likely to exit teaching. Non-unionized teachers with a 
degree in education are twice as likely to remain in teaching than unionized teachers with 
the same degree. Similar results were found for math, science, and advanced degrees. 
Since this is an analysis of first year teachers, many do not have advanced degrees or 
master’s degrees. Unionized teachers who were previously unemployed are 3.9% more 
likely to exit teaching compared to the non-unionized teachers who are 4.9% less likely 
to exit teaching. This may reflect the ease in which unionized teachers can re-enter a 
unionized teaching position compared to a non-unionized position. Unionized teachers 
who were attacked or threatened the previous year are 10% more likely to leave teaching 
compared to 3.6% of non-unionized teachers. This reflects the expulsion tolerance of 
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school administrators to maintain teachers’ safety. Unionized teachers who had a teacher 
practicum were 7.9% less likely to leave teaching compared to 14.2% of non-unionized 
teachers. Interestingly, an increase of $1000 lowered the likelihood of leaving by only 
.6% for unionized teachers and .7% for non-unionized teachers. Thus, compared to a 
mandatory teacher practicum, raising teacher salary will do little to lower teacher 
attrition. 
 Figure 3 displays individuals’ average latent propensities to exit teaching in 
unionized and non-unionized schools. The star points represent teachers who are 
observed in the data to teach in unionized schools while the plus points represent teachers 
who are observed to teach in non-unionized schools. 86.2% of all teachers have negative 
propensities to exit teaching in unionized schools compared to 72.5% of all teachers for 
non-union schools. Individuals’ propensities to exit teaching are much larger for teaching 
in unionized schools than non-unionized schools, especially for the negative propensities. 
This is not indicative of individuals having larger propensities to remain in teaching for 
unionized schools than non-unionized schools since the distributions are not identical. 
Calculating the propensities in probability provide a units of measure which are 
comparable. However, statement on individual’s consistency of choice across union 
status can be made. From this estimation, 91% of individuals are consistent in their exit 
decision across union status, i.e., their propensities to exit teaching in unionized and non-
unionized schools are of the same sign.  The remaining 9% have positive propensity for 
one union status and negative for the other. 
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The majority of these individuals, 68%, have negative propensities to exit for 
teaching in unionized schools and positive status for teaching in non-unionized schools, 
i.e., they exit teaching in non-unionized schools while remaining teaching in unionized 
schools.  
 Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution of the average treatment effect 
calculated as the difference in propensities to exit teaching between unionized and non-
unionized schools which is measure in probability to exit teaching. A positive (negative) 
difference in probabilities indicates that the probability to exit teaching in a unionized 
school is greater (less) than the probability to exit teaching in non-union school. Figure 4 
indicates that unions have a negative effect on teacher attrition for 89% of all teachers. Of 
those negatively affected, the average effect is a 14.7% decrease in the probability of 
exiting teaching in a unionized school. Of those positively affected, the average effect is a 
4.7% increase in the probability of exiting teaching in a union. 
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Table 11 displays the average treatment effect measured in the difference in 
probabilities to exit teaching in unionized and non-unionized schools. This is calculated 
explicitly since the counterfactual propensity to exit teaching is available from the 
posterior. For the sample of teachers, the ATE indicates that, on average, a randomly 
selected teacher is 16.7% more likely to remain in teaching due to unionization. The 
posterior standard deviation for this estimate is 4.3%. 
 
Post Mean Post std. Pr( • > 0 | Data)
Average Treatment Effect 0.167 0.043 1.00
Table 11: ATE from Unionization on Teacher Attrition
 
 
The ATE is very far from 0. To calculate how much of the propensity to remain in 
teaching to attribute to the dismissal barriers unions possess, I divide each teachers’ 
treatment effect in probabilities through by their probability of remaining in teaching in 
unionized schools. This provides how much of the probability to remain teaching in a 
unionized school is attributed to the union. Table 12 provides the posterior predictive 
mean and standard deviation for a randomly selected teacher. 
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Figure 4: Union Effect on Exit Decision
76 
Post Mean Post std. Pr( • > 0 | Data)
Attributed to Dismissal Barriers 0.206 0.064 1.00
Table 12: The Effect of Dismissal Barriers on Teacher Attrition
 
 
For the randomly selected teacher, on average, 20.6% of the propensity to remain 
in teaching is be attributed to unionized while 79.4% is attributed to the type of individual 
who prepares for and teaches in unionized schools. Using the propensities of all teachers, 
I find that 3% of the 8% difference in attrition rates can be attributed to the union while 
5% of the difference in attrition rate can be attributed to the self-selection into teaching. 
Thus, unions cannot account the majority of the difference found in the data. For unions 
to explain this much attrition, they would have to substantially increase the propensity to 
remain in teaching. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the degree to which dismissal barriers affect 
teacher attrition. Teacher attrition is also affected by the self-selection of individuals into 
teaching.  By explicitly calculating each teacher’s propensity to remain teaching in both 
unionized and non-unionized schools, the effect of unions on attrition is observable. For 
the majority of teachers, the decision to remain or stay is independent of union status. 
That is, most will exit or remain teaching regardless of whether they teach in a unionized 
school or not. This provides evidence that the difference in teacher attrition observed in 
the data has more to do with individuals’ self-selection process into teaching than to the 
barriers to dismissal unions provide. Thus, how one self-selects into teaching determines 
how long one stays in the teaching profession. 
 The teacher attrition literature has focused primarily on determining the 
influences on mobility decisions of teachers in public unionized schools. This paper’s 
contribution is to extend these analyses to understand the role of unions on teachers’ 
mobility decisions. While unions do provide many barriers to dismissal which lower the 
attrition rate for teachers in unionized schools, the magnitude is not as great as indicated 
in the data. I find that teachers’ unions can account for 21% of the propensity to remain in 
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teaching while 79% of the propensity to remain in teaching is due to individuals’ 
characteristics. While this may seem large, the estimates indicate that not many teachers 
are significantly influenced in changing their exit decision across union status. That is, 
91% of all teachers are consistent with their exit decision across union status, either 
remaining or exiting in both teaching in unionized and non-unionized schools. 6% of all 
teachers would stay in a unionized school while exiting non-unionized schools while 3% 
of all teachers would stay in non-unionized schools while exiting unionized schools. 
Furthermore, only 3% of the 8% difference in attrition is attributed to the union while the 
remaining 5% is due to self-selection of teachers in unionized schools. 
 This work is a part of a larger research agenda. Gilpin and Kaganovich (2008) 
analyze the dynamical trade-off of quantity and quality of teachers over the last forty 
years for the United States. Collective bargaining contracts bind school administrators to 
salary schedules instead of market wages. The implication is that administrators face a 
trade-off of quantity and quality of teachers, and the bias shifts in favor of quantity given 
the evolution the wage distribution in the production economy exhibits an increasing skill 
premium. This tendency to prefer quantity to quality of teachers should cause the attrition 
rates to fall over time for those schools which have collective bargaining contracts. Table 
12 provides the attrition rates for both unionized and non-unionized teacher attrition rates 
over the last 17 year for the U.S. Unionized attrition has fallen by 2% over this time 
period while non-unionized teacher attrition has risen. The analysis of Gilpin and 
Kaganovich (2008) demonstrates that with rising wage dispersion in the production 
economy over time, the optimal hiring policies of school administrators will be to raise 
the quantity of teachers at the expense of their relative quality. This would raise the 
barriers to dismissal as school administrators prefer to have a large quantity of teachers 
over their quality. While this result is consistent with facts, one can also observe at the 
same time, in non-unionized schools, the teacher attrition rate has fallen.16 One 
explanation is that it is difficult to retain individuals with higher outside of teaching wage 
rates. 
                                                 
16
 In the 2004 data, the teacher attrition rate in non-unionized schools falls due to the large quantity of 
newly created charters which characteristically have low attrition rates.  
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Year Union Non-Union
1988-89 9.2 20.2
1991-92 9.3 21.4
1994-95 7.5 23.2
2000-01 8.1 23.4
Table 13: Union and Non-Union Schools 
Teacher Attrition Over Time1,2
Source: TFS 1989, 1992, 1995, 2001
Footnotes
1: In percent.
2: Weighted observations
 
 
Researchers have found mixed results from policies directed at raising the 
quantity and quality of teachers. Angrist and Lavy (1999) find that reducing class size 
causes significant and substantial increase in test scores for some grades but not others. 
Krueger (1999) analyzes data from Tennessee Project STAR finds that students’ scores 
increase by four percentage points in the first year of students attending smaller classes, 
while in subsequent years the test scores grow by about one percentage point per year. 
Hanushek (1999) rebuts Krueger’s findings citing important design and implementation 
issues from the STAR project that suggest the returns to class size reduction are biased 
upwards. Clotfelter et al. (2007) conclude that teacher experience, test scores and regular 
licensure all have greater positive effects on student achievement, whether compared to 
the effects of changes in class size or to the socioeconomic characteristics of students. In 
comparison Goldhaber and Anthony (2007), using the same data, find mixed evidence 
that improved observable teacher credentials have positive impact on student 
achievement. Rivkin et al. (2005) suggest that a ten student reduction in class size 
produces smaller benefits than one standard deviation improvement in teacher quality. 
Aaronson et al. (2007) find that replacing a teacher with another that is rated two standard 
deviations superior in quality can add 0.35 to 0.45 grade equivalents (or 30 to 40 percent 
of an average school year’s worth) to a student's math score performance. 
Many education policies that are designed to increase either quantity or quality of 
teachers do receive an increase in education expenditures to fulfill these mandates. This 
forces school administrators to trade-off quantity or quality of teachers to satisfy the 
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mandate. One example is California’s class size reduction program. This program came 
at a cost of hiring lower quality teachers to staff additional classrooms, which offset the 
benefits of smaller classes (see Jepson and Rivkin (2002)). By not increasing 
expenditures, the type of teacher hired is different from the composition of current 
teachers. These teachers self-select into teaching for different reasons than current 
teachers and will remain in teaching for different durations. Future work is needed to 
understand how this change in composition of teachers has affected the teacher attrition 
rate over time. By estimating how self-selection and the effect of unionization have 
changed over time, researchers can obtain a better understanding on how current policies 
affect the self-selection process and how the barriers to dismissal affect differing 
compositions of entering teachers. This will also serve as an empirical validation to the 
quantity-quality trade-off as theorized by Gilpin and Kaganovich (2008).  
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Appendix A:  Data Construction 
 
Two rounds of SASS (1999-00 and 2003-04) and two rounds of TFS (2000-01 and 2004-
05) are pooled together to form one dataset. Pooling seems reasonable as the two rounds 
are close together in years and collective bargaining legislation has not changed 
significantly over the last six years. 
 The TFS is a stratified sample and has weights to aggregate the sample to the U.S. 
teaching population. According to the Documentation for the 2004-05 Teacher Follow-up 
Survey, the TFS weights are equal to the inverse of the sampled teacher’s probability of 
selection after three adjustments. The first adjustment was applied to reflect the impact of 
the SASS teacher weighting procedure. Next, a nonresponse adjustment factor was 
calculated and applied using information known about the respondents from the sampling 
frame data. Finally, a ratio adjustment factor was calculated and applied to the sample to 
adjust the sample totals to frame totals in order to reduce sampling variability. 
 Stratification can cause potential bias depending on the outcome of analysis. 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) note that weighted estimators that adjust for differences in 
sampling rates may be necessary if the goal of analysis is a prediction of the population 
behavior. Such weighting is unnecessary if the conditional model for y given x is 
correctly specified and stratification is not on the dependent variable. If samples are 
determined in part by the value of the dependent variables, then weighted estimation is 
necessary. My primary interest lies with first year teachers with the comparison of 
unionized versus non-unionized attrition rates. The SASS was constructed to assure a 
minimum teacher sampling of 2,300 new teachers per school type (public, private). This 
constraint poses no problem for new public school teachers due to the large number of 
sampled schools with new teachers. However, for private school teachers, new teachers 
were oversampled by a factor of 1.5.17 Since all private schools do not have teachers’ 
unions, without weighting the sample, this will lead to incorrect estimates of population 
impacts. For each population descriptive, I use the variable tfsfinwt to weight the 
observations. Although I estimate the parameters using unweighted estimation, weighting 
                                                 
17
 See Documentation for the 2004-05 Teacher Follow-up Survey pg. 20. 
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is used in subsequent impact calculations to predict population impacts, rather than 
sample impacts (See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pg. 820-821).  
 Each teacher in the SASS is given an identification number. For teachers 
surveyed in both the SASS and the TFS, this identification number links the two surveys’ 
data at the teacher level. TFS do not attempt to link teachers across rounds which only 
permits repeated cross-sectional analysis to be conducted. This type of survey design 
creates a stock sample versus a flow sample used in duration analysis (See Lancaster, 
1990). The main feature of stock sampling is spell length bias as the probability of being 
in the sample increases with spell length. The probability increases due to left truncation, 
i.e., those who have completed spells before the sample are omitted which causes those 
remaining in the sample to be seen with higher frequency. Stock sampling also has right 
censoring at the time of the sample since there are still teachers who haven’t yet teaching. 
Jenkins (1995) demonstrates a method to reformat the data that addresses both the left 
truncation and right censoring. This entails changing the unit of analysis from the 
individual to the time at risk of an event: exiting teaching. The main analysis focuses on 
first-year teachers where stock sampling isn’t an issue since the stock is also the flow. 
 The TFS contains most of the teacher and school characteristics needed in the 
analysis but I use other data sources to complete the dataset. The first ancillary data is 
from the 2000 Census which contains community-level data for each 5-digit zip code 
across the U.S. I use the zip code level data as private schools are not identifiable at the 
district level in the SASS/TFS surveys. The census data contains measures of 
socioeconomic well-being in the communities where teachers teach. The second ancillary 
data is from five rounds of National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) data. The 
TFS data set does not contain a measure of teacher aptitude, so ACT scores are imputed 
for each teacher equal to their undergraduate university’s ACT average. Second, the 
imputed teachers’ ACT scores are constructed using ACT scores and SAT scores 
converted to ACT scores at the university level.18 130,670 student records are combined 
to create 2,052 university level enhanced ACT scores. There are 63.68 student records, 
                                                 
18
 It was brought to my attention that the ACT and SAT scoring have been adjusted over the last 20 years. 
This is to my advantage as I don’t have to deflate scores while aggregating them over time.  
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on average, per university to construct the enhanced ACT scores. The aggregation of 
individual ACT scores to university-level ACT scores flattens the tails of the distribution 
which can be seen with a maximum enhanced ACT score of 35. 
 The last ancillary data is from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s TR3 
database on collective bargaining state laws. This permits an investigation on how state 
laws affect individuals’ decisions to enter teachers’ unions.19 The state level collective 
bargaining laws are matched to teachers by the state in which a teacher earned his/her 
undergraduate degree. These laws are then used as an instrument to identify the 
probability of joining a union but should not affect the mobility decision of teachers, 
 I now turn to the restriction I impose on the dataset. The first restriction is on 
class size which is restricted to less than 50 students per teacher, omitting one teacher 
with an average class size of 246. I also restrict teachers’ salaries to be above $10,000. 
This omits 4% of the sample. Lastly, age is restricted to be less than 50. This is somewhat 
arbitrary but necessary to minimize the retirement influence on teachers. 
 
  
                                                 
19
 See Table C2 in Appendix C for a full listing on state collective bargaining laws. 
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Variable Label Variable Description Metric
2003-04 SASS 
& 2004-05 TFS 
Variables
1999-00 SASS 
& 2000-01 TFS 
Variables
Dependent Variables
   Member of teachers' union Individual reports member of teachers' union Binary UNION_S UNION
   Exit Decision Individual reports exiting teaching Binary STTUS_TF STATUS1
Independent Variables
   Gender Individual reports being female Binary GENDER_S GENDER
   Age Age on TFS survey Z+ | Z<50 AGE_TF AGE_TT
   Non-White Individual reports being non-white Binary RACETH_T RACE
   Married Individual reports being married Binary F0234 F01952
   Dependents under 5 Number of dependents under 5 on TFS Z+ F0233 F0197
   Outside Teaching Job Outside teaching job during teaching year Binary T0406 T0354
   Outside Non-Teaching Job Outside non-teaching job during teaching year Binary T0406 T0354
   Household Income1 Household income greater then 50K Binary F02313 F01944
   Class Size Number of students per teacher at school Z+ | Z<50 STU_TCH STU_TCH
   Attacked or Threatened Individual reports being attacked/threatened during last year Binary T0388 & T0385
ATTACK & 
THREAT5
   Teacher Practicum Individual had a teacher practicum Binary T0155 T0128
   Special Education Assignment Individual's main assignment is sp. ed. Binary ASSIGN03 ASSIGN6
   Math & Science Assignment Individual's main assignment is math or sci. Binary ASSIGN03 ASSIGN
   Not In Labor Force Last Year Individual not in labor force prior to teaching Binary T0030 T0059
   BA in Education Individual report a BA major in education Binary T0119, T0121, and 
T01327
T0072, T0074, and  
T00888
   BA in Math / Science Individual reports a BA major in math/science Binary T0119, T0121, and 
T01329
T0072, T0074, and 
T008810
   Advanced Degree Individual has advanced degree Binary HIDEGR_S HIDEGREE
   School Related Earnings11 Individuals reported school related earnings Z+ | Z>10K EARNSCH EARNSCH
   Charter School Individual teaches at a charter school Binary CHARFLAG SECTOR12
   Religious Individual teaches at a religious school Binary RELIG RELIG
   Elementary School Individual teaches at an elementary school Binary SCHLEVE2 SCHLEVE2
   Middle School Individual teaches at a middle school Binary SCHLEVE2 SCHLEVE2
   Urban Individual teaches in an urban community Binary URBANS03 URBANIC
Ancillary Data
   ACT Score Imputed ACT score Z+
   % with BA or higher Percent of community a BA or adv. degree Percent
   Median Household Income11 Community's median household income Z+
   State Requires Col. Bargaining State requires collective bargaining Binary
Footnotes
1: Recoded L to 1, S to  2, and M to 3. 7: Codes 101-136, 160-162, and 181-182.
2: Recoded 3 to 5. 8: Codes  01 - 44.
3: Recoded 1,2 to 1, 3,4 to 2, and  5,6 to 3. 9: Codes 190 - 218.
4: Recoded 1,2,3 to 1, 4,5 to 2, and 6 to 3. 10: Codes 57 - 63, and 68 - 69.
5: Recoded 2 to 1. 11: In 1000s of 2004 dollars.
12: Recoded D to 1.
Table A1: Variable Labels, Defintions, and Data Sources
6: Recoded 2 to 8, 3 to 4, 4 to 10, 5 to 2, 7 to 5, and 8  to 11.
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Variable Label Data Source Year N
   ACT Score1 NPSAS 1990 ACT sattotal2 6316
NPSAS 1992 ACT sattotal2 23592
NPSAS 1996 ACT sattotal2 41256
NPSAS 2000 TEACTCRE TESATDER2 35481
NPSAS 2004 ASTACTS SAT2 24025
   % with BA or higher3 2000 P037015 P037032
2000 P037016 P037033
2000 P037017 P037034
2000 P037018 P037035
2000 P037001
   Median Household Income3
U.S. Census 
Summary File 3 
(SF 3)
2000 P053001
Footnotes
1: Linked to TFS by IPEDS number.
2: SAT are converted to ACT using UC-SD converter (see Electronic references)
3: Linked to TFS by 5-digit zip code.
Variables
Table A2: Ancillary Data Summary
U.S. Census 
Summary File 3 
(SF 3)
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Variable Name Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
Dependent Variables
   Member of Teachers' Assocation 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
   Exit Decision 0.08 5.59 0 1 0.17 5.13 0 1
Independent Variables
   Gender 0.74 8.9 0 1 0.78 5.85 0 1
   Age 29.9 153.4 22 50 29.66 102.1 22 50
   Non-White 0.18 7.8 0 1 0.20 5.65 0 1
   Married 0.46 10.2 0 1 0.44 7 0 1
   Dependents under 5 0.28 11.4 0 3 0.34 8.41 0 3
   Outside Teaching Job 0.05 4.6 0 1 0.05 3.09 0 1
   Outside Non-Teaching Job 0.15 7.3 0 1 0.11 4.46 0 1
   Household Income1 0.55 10.1 0 1 0.40 6.92 0 1
   Class Size 15.6 83.0 3.37 41.48 14.18 61.1 0.47 41.91
   Attacked or Threatened 0.10 6.1 0 1 0.09 4 0 1
   Teacher Practicum 0.92 5.7 0 1 0.77 5.91 0 1
   Special Education Assignment 0.10 6.1 0 1 0.08 3.89 0 1
   Math & Science Assignment 0.16 7.4 0 1 0.25 6.11 0 1
   ACT Score 21.5 46.6 14.25 30.57 21.57 38.19 13.53 32.5
   Not In Labor Force Last Year 0.48 10.2 0 1 0.49 7.05 0 1
   BA in Education 0.56 10.1 0 1 0.5 7.05 0 1
   BA in Math / Science 0.11 6.5 0 1 0.14 4.85 0 1
   Advanced Degree 0.16 7.4 0 1 0.11 4.46 0 1
   School Related Earnings2 32.8 126.5 15 90.12 30 82.83 10.8 73.45
   Charter School 0.01 1.5 0 1 0.05 2.93 0 1
   Religious 0.01 1.6 0 1 0.27 6.24 0 1
   Elementary School 0.51 10.2 0 1 0.48 7.05 0 1
   Middle School 0.19 8.0 0 1 0.09 4.13 0 1
   Urban 0.86 7.0 0 1 0.81 5.57 0 1
   % with BA or higher 22.1 276.2 2.86 74.45 23.07 218.2 0 75.64
   Median Household Income2 55.9 428.5 12.78 174.6 50.67 288.5 11.65 148.9
   State Requires Collective Bargaining 0.77 8.6 0 1 0.55 7.02 0 1
   Where Teacher Earned Bachelor's Degree
Footnotes
1: Above $50,000.
2: In 1000s of 2004 dollars.
Source: SASS 1999-00, 2003-4, TFS 2000-01, 2004-05, NPSAS 1989-90,1995-96, 1999-00, 2003-04, Census 2000, National Council on Teacher 
Quality - TR3
Table A3: Summary Statistics by Teachers' Assocation Status
Union (Treated state) Non-Union (Untreated state)
Instrument on decision to join a teachers' association
  obs = 469     weighted obs =   obs = 615     weighted obs = 122066.2
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Appendix B:  The Posterior Simulator and Data Generated Experiment 
 
B.1.  The Posterior Simulator 
Blow is the posterior simulator for fitting the parameterized treatment-response model. I 
adopt the standard notation x−Γ  to denote all parameters other than x . I first group the 
joint posterior into * * *1 0[ , , , , ]D y y β Σ . The latent data will be sampled in blocking steps, 
while the regression parameters and covariance matrix will be drawn from their complete 
posterior conditional. The Gibbs sampler cycles through steps 1 through 6 as described 
below until convergence is obtained. Post convergence draws are used to produce the 
posterior distribution.  
 
MCMC Algorithm for sampling 
 
Step 1: Sampling β  
 Conditioned on the values of the observed and missing latent data, it is 
straightforward to sample from the complete conditional 
 | , , ( , ),y D N D d Dβ β β ββ −Γ :  (21) 
where 
 
1 1 1 1 1[ '( ) ]  and [ '( ) ].n nD R I R V d R I S Vβ β β ββ µ− − − − −= Σ ⊗ + = Σ ⊗ +  
and 
  
*
* *
3 1 1 1 3 ( 2 )
* *
0 0
0 0
(1 ) , and 0 0 .
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miss
n n k k
miss
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S DY D Y R X
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× × +
   
   ≡ + − ≡   
   + −   
 
Step 2: Sample Σ  
 In sampling Σ , I exploit the fact that the error vectors are already known. That is, 
one can sample from the complete conditionals given: 
 
1
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where 
 
' 1 1 ' 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
' 1 1 ' 1
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' 1 1 ' 1
10 1 1 10 10 1 0 10 1
[ ]  and [ ]
[ ]  and [ ]
[ ]  and [ ].
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D D D D D D D D
D
D V d V
D V d V
D V d V
ε ε ε ε µ
ε ε ε ε µ
ε ε ε ε µ
− − −
− − −
− − −
= + = +
= + = +
= + = +
 
 
 I reject 1 0 10, , and D Dσ σ σ draws that are not between [0,1] so as to have proper 
interpretation as covariance/correlations. From these draws, I construct Σ 20. Since, as 
noted early, Σmust be positive definite, I accept/reject Σ based on all eigenvalues being 
negative.21 
 The remaining steps in the posterior simulator involve sampling of the latent data 
.S  Since the Jacobian of the transformation from the error vector to the outcome 
quantities is unity, the trivariate normal distribution for * * *1 0[   ]i i iD y y  is easily derived. 
Assuming observations are independent of one another, I can draw from univariate 
normals. I proceed by sampling from the following densities: 
 
* * *
1 0| , , , ,y y D y DΓ  (23) 
 
* * *
1 0| , , , ,y y D y DΓ  (24) 
and 
 
* * *
1 0| , , , ,D y y y DΓ  (25) 
 
Step 3: Sample observed and missing latent outcome data 
1 0
* *
1 1 and 
miss
n ny y  from the 
conditional 
           
(0, ) 1 1 1
ind
* * *
( ,0] 1 1 11 0
1 1
( , ) if d 1 & y 1
( , ) if d 1 & y 0| , , , , ~ , 1, 2, ,
if d 0( , )
i i i
i i ii
ii
TN
TNy y D y D i n
N
µ σ
µ σ
µ σ
∞
−∞
= =
 = =Γ =
 =
K
 (26) 
                                                 
20
 See Li (1998) for further discussion. 
21
 A Metropolis-Hastings algorithm inside of the Gibbs Sampler can be substituted in this step. During 
simulations, both performed equally well in terms of estimating the true parameters. In terms of speed, 
obviously the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is much slower. 
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where 
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1 0 10,  ,  and D Dσ σ σ  refer to the covariance/correlation parameters between the treated and 
untreated outcome errors  and outcome and selection equation errors. ( , ) ( , )a bTN µ σ  
denotes a univariate normal density with mean µ  and variance σ , truncated to the 
interval ( , )a b . 
 With the missing or potential outcomes, I simply draw from a normal density 
since there are no restrictions. The observed outcomes are related to latent variables using 
standard textbook techniques of drawing from a truncated normal density. 
 
Step 4: Sample observed and missing latent outcome data 
0 0
* *
0 0 and 
miss
n ny y  from the 
conditional 
 Similarly, I can sample from: 
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Step 5: Sample missing latent data *D  
 The conditional distribution of the latent data *iD  is complicated by the fact that I 
know the sign. With this minor complication, I draw similarly to the latent outcomes 
from a conditional normal, which is truncated by the observed value of iD : 
 *
ind (0, )*
( ,0]
( , ) if d 1,| , , ~ 1,2,....,( , ) if 0i
iD iD i
i d
iD iD i
TN
d y D i n
TN d
µ σ
µ σ
∞
−
−∞
=
Γ = =
 (28) 
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Step 6: Repeat 1-5 using the most recent values of the conditioning variables. 
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B.2.  Data Generated Experiment 
I conduct a generated data simulation to demonstrate the performance of the posterior 
simulator. A sample of 5000N =  observations is generated from the following potential 
outcomes model: 
 
*
0 1 1 2 2
*
1 10 11 1 1
*
0 00 01 1 0
,
,
,
i i i iD
i i i
i i i
d w w
y x
y x
γ γ γ ε
β β ε
β β ε
= + + +
= + +
= + +
 
where ikw is drawn independently from a (0,1)N  distribution   1,2k =  as well as 1ix . 
The error terms 1 0[   ]'iD i iε ε ε  are drawn jointly from the trivariate Normal distribution 
 1
0
0 1 .2 .2
~ 0 , .2 1 .2
0 .2 .2 1
iD iid
i
i
N
ε
ε
ε
      
     
     
           
. 
Finally, the regression parameters are set as follows 
 1 0[.2,3.5,1],   [1.2,2],   [.5,1.5]γ β β= = =  
 I follow the steps for 2000 draws, dropping the first 500 as burn-ins and keeping 
every 5th draw. Table 6 provides a comparison of the true values and the values obtained 
from the posterior distribution. Overall, the simulator works well in estimating the 
parameter values and the latent variables. To correct for autocorrelation, I take every 5th 
draw which seems to alleviate the issue. This is an inherent issue with limited dependent 
models in general. In terms of performance, all parameter estimates are within two 
standard deviations and all but two are within one standard deviation of the true values. 
As this experiment was conducted several times, performance remains consistent. 
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True Value Post Mean Post Std.
Regression Parameters
   γ0 0.2 0.180 0.03
   γ1 3.5 3.546 0.10
   γ2 1 0.982 0.05
   β10 1.2 1.288 0.06
   β11 2 1.866 0.14
   β00 0.5 0.399 0.04
   β01 1.5 1.425 0.06
Latent Effects
   D* 0.2438 0.2166 0.0301
   Y*1 1.2245 1.3111 0.0609
   Y*0 0.5359 0.4154 0.0401
Footnotes
Table B1: Simulation Results1
1: Results are based on 2,000 MCMC draws.
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Appendix C.  Associated Tables 
 
Code Code Description Occupation Code
1 Management occupations 0010-0430
2 Business and financial operations occupations 0500-0950
3 Computer and mathematical science occupations 1000-1240
4 Architecture and engineering occupations 1300-1560
5 Life, physical, and social science occupations 1600-1960
6 Community and social service occupations 2000-2060
7 Legal occupations 2100-2150
8 Education, training, and library occupations 2200-2550
9 Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations 2600-2960
10 Healthcare practitioner and technical occupations 3000-3540
11 Healthcare support occupations 3600-3650
12 Protective service occupations 3700-3950
13 Food preparation and serving related occupations 4000-4160
14 Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations 4200-4250
15 Personal care and service occupations 4300-4650
16 Sales and related occupations 4700-4960
17 Office and administrative support occupations 5000-5930
18 Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations 6000-6130
19 Construction and extraction occupations 6200-6940
20 Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations 7000-7620
21 Production occupations 7700-8960
22 Transportation and material moving occupations 9000-9750
23 Armed Forces 9840
Table C1: NAICS 2000 Occupation Codes
Source: Current Population Survey 2005 Annual Social and Economics Supplement, Appendix B
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State Minimum number of years before tenure is granted
Legality of Collective 
Bargaining1,2,3
   Alabama 3 2
   Alaska 3 1
   Arizona 3 2
   Arkansas 3 2
   California 2 1
   Colorado 3 2
   Connecticut 4 1
   Delaware 3 1
   Florida 3 1
   Georgia 3 3
   Hawaii 2 1
   Idaho 3 1
   Illinois 4 1
   Indiana 5 1
   Iowa 3 1
   Kansas 3 1
   Kentucky 4 2
   Louisiana 3 2
   Maine 2 1
   Maryland 2 1
   Massachusetts 3 1
   Michigan 4 1
   Minnesota 3 1
   Mississippi 1 2
   Missouri 5 2
   Montana 3 1
   Nebraska 3 1
   Nevada 2 1
   New Hampshire 3 1
   New Jersey 3 1
   New Mexico 3 1
   New York 3 1
   North Carolina 4 3
   North Dakota 1 1
   Ohio 3 1
   Oklahoma 3 1
   Oregon 3 1
   Pennsylvania 3 1
   Rhode Island 3 1
   South Carolina 2 3
   South Dakota 4 1
   Tennessee 3 1
   Texas 3 3
   Utah 3 2
   Vermont 2 1
   Virginia 3 3
   Washington 2 1
   West Virginia 3 2
   Wisconsin 3 1
   Wyoming 3 2
Footnote:
Table C2: Tenure and Collective Bargaining Summary
1 State requires collective bargaining.
2 Collective bargaining is permissible.
3 Collective bargaining is explicitly illegal.
Source: TR3 Database From The National Council on Teacher Quality
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Chapter 3 
Unequal Longevity and Social Security: 
The Implications for Human Capital, Growth and 
Distribution 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the implications of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system for 
human capital investment, economic growth and income distribution when longevity is 
dependent on human capital attainment. The results indicate that when a social security 
system is implemented, the effects on growth and welfare inequality are temporally non-
monotonic. While PAYG pensions encourage human capital investment at a cost of lower 
growth in the short-run, it results in increased life expectancy of the subsequent 
generations, providing additional incentive to save for retirement. Thus, in the long-run, 
implementing PAYG social security causes the stock of human capital to grow; savings 
will increase due to the dynamic externality, thereby so will the aggregate output. 
 
JEL classification: H55, D91, I28, O4 
 
Equation Section (Next) 
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1.  Introduction 
It is well-known in the literature that pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security systems may 
have a negative effect on physical capital accumulation due to a reduction of savings for 
retirement. The standard thought is that this is a trade-off to lowering welfare inequality. 
Recent research suggests that PAYG social security provides incentives for working-age 
individuals to invest in education and other human capital of the younger generation in 
order to increase pension benefits in retirement (See Bellettini and Certoni (1999), 
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Glomm and Kaganovich (2008), and Kaganovich and 
Meier (2008)). Under certain conditions these investments can lead to higher growth 
while reducing inequality. This paper continues this research by exploring the dynamic 
externality generated by social security on subsequent generations, that of inadvertently 
increasing the younger generation’s longevity due to increasing their human capital. 
 Most of the theoretical research on the impact of social security systems on 
growth and welfare inequality assumes that all individuals have identical longevities (See 
Glomm and Kaganovich (2008), Kaganovich and Meier (2008), and Zhang, Zhang and 
Leung (2006)). Glomm and Kaganovich (2008) study the growth-inequality relationship 
assuming that individuals have identical longevities in an overlapping generations (OLG) 
model with PAYG Beveridgian social security. They find that if the social security 
system is sufficiently small, then growth can be enhanced while reducing welfare 
inequality. Zhang, Zhang and Leung (2006) explore the effect of annuity-based PAYG 
Beveridgian social security on output and welfare with homogenous agents. Zhang et al. 
(2006) find that aggregate welfare increases at a cost of lower output.22 Kaganovich and 
Meier (2008) study the growth implications of fully funded versus unfunded Beveridgian 
and Bismarckian social security schemes, assuming that individuals have identical 
mortality. They conclude that Beveridgian PAYG pensions achieve the highest growth 
rate relative to the other pension designs. In their paper, a small open economy is 
                                                 
22
 This precludes an analysis on the progressivity of social security. See Echevarría and Iza (2006) as well. 
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considered which implies that there is no adverse effect on the physical capital stock from 
the PAYG design. Neither of these papers addresses welfare inequality.23 
The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamical effects of PAYG social 
security schemes on short-run and long-run growth and welfare inequality. Up to this 
point, the results on growth and welfare tend to be temporally monotonic; welfare 
inequality and growth increase or decrease for all subsequent generations after a social 
security scheme is implemented. The argument in this paper is that implementing PAYG 
Beveridgian social security schemes raises the human capital of the younger generations 
which, in turn, increases longevity of subsequent generations. The increase in longevity 
raises individuals’ concern for retirement. Confronted with a longer retirement, 
individuals devote a higher fraction of their lifetime resources to savings at the cost of 
consumption and investments in children’s human capital. Thus, the dynamic externality 
of raising human capital of younger generations affects future generations’ human 
capital. This analysis investigates the effect of this dynamic externality on human capital 
accumulation and growth. 
This work is closely related to another line of research which studies the effect of 
unequal longevity on the progressivity of social security. Hachon (2008) studies how 
varying the dependency of longevity on innate ability, which directly predicts earnings 
capabilities, affects the progressivity of various social security systems. He finds that 
when longevity is dependent on innate ability, implementing a purely Beveridgian social 
security system makes the pension benefit formula a function of longevity, reducing 
inequality only if the distribution of longevity is more equal than the distribution of 
human capital. Empirical research estimating the degree of progressivity for the U.S. 
social security system indicates that accounting for shorter longevities of poorer 
individuals, the U.S. social security system is not as progressive as previously perceived 
and may be slightly regressive (see Brown (2003), Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass 
(2000), Garrett (2007), Kotlikoff et al. (1998)), and Panis and Lillard (1996). 
                                                 
23
 In Kaganovich and Meier (2008), it can be inferred that the Beveridgian formula reduces inequality while 
the Bismarckian formula does not. 
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I first explore the effect of implementing Beveridgian PAYG social security 
assuming that longevity is independent of human capital attainment to provide a 
benchmark. These results are standard in the literature. I then assume longevity is 
dependent on human capital attainment and study the effect of implementing social 
security. Using transition paths provides a basis of comparison for the effects in the short 
and long run. Assuming longevity is independent versus dependent of human capital 
attainment on intra-generational transfers and on short/long run growth and welfare 
inequality are quite distinct. Under either assumption, implementing PAYG social 
security acts as the vehicle to lowering welfare inequality. However, the effect on growth 
is conditional upon two factors: 1) dependency of longevity on human capital attainment 
and 2) the size of the social security system. 
 When longevity is independent of human capital attainment, the standard results 
found in the literature are confirmed: under certain parametric conditions, if the size of 
social security is sufficiently small, then implementing social security enhances growth. 
It is now well known in the literature that the PAYG feature provides working-age 
individuals incentives to invest in the human capital of the young generation in order to 
increase their social security benefits in retirement. Growth is enhanced as long as the 
increase in human capital is sufficiently large to offset the decrease in savings. As the 
social security system becomes large, savings decrease causing the task of compensating 
this loss in production to be increasingly more difficult. 
When longevity is dependent on human capital attainment, many of the 
benchmark results may not hold. I find that when the social security system is sufficiently 
large, growth exhibits a temporally non-monotonic relationship: growth declines in the 
short-run and rises in the long-run. There are two effects from implementing social 
security which drive this result, one which is standard and the other which is a new 
insight provided by this paper. The first one is that the PAYG formula causes individuals 
to increase investments in the younger generation’s human capital. The Beveridgian 
formula causes human capital of the poor to increase more than the human capital of the 
wealthy. Thus, aggregate human capital of the younger generation rises while reducing 
welfare inequality. When social security is large, the increase in human capital is not 
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sufficient to compensate for the decrease in savings from the PAYG design, lowering 
output in the short-run. 
The second effect is the dynamic externality of lengthening future generation’s 
longevity due to their increased human capital. Increasing longevity raises concern for 
consumption during retirement. Confronted with a longer retirement, individuals devote a 
higher fraction of their lifetime resources to savings. Thus, in the long-run, implementing 
PAYG social security causes the stock of human capital to grow; in the long-run savings 
will increase due to the dynamic externality, thereby so will the aggregate output. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, Section 3 defines 
the Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium, Section 4 presents the solution of the benchmark 
model, and Sections 5 provides the results for implementing social security schemes. 
Section 6 concludes. The appendices contain numerical results. 
 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider an OLG economy populated by individuals who live for three periods, youth, 
working-age, and retirement. Each individual is indexed by family name ω  and by 
generation which is identified with the period the individual is working-age. Individuals 
born in period 1t −  make up generation t . Let tΩ  denote the set of individuals of 
generation t  and ( )tµ ω  be the Lebesgue measure which is assumed to be well defined. 
The population is constant and normalized to 1. Youth and working-age periods both 
have length 1 while the last period of life, retirement, has length 1.T ≤  
Individuals have two economically active periods, working-age and retirement. 
During the first period of life, children remain economically inactive, making no 
decisions of their own, while acquiring human capital. Individuals become active during 
their working-age, deriving income from work, making consumption decisions, and 
investing in both savings and human capital of their children. In retirement, individuals 
finance consumption from the returns on savings and an annuity-based public pension, if 
available. 
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2.1.  Human Capital Formation 
The human capital of a young individual ω  in generation 1t +  is produced using a 
private input contributed by his parent, ( ),te ω  in the production function 
 1( ) ( )t th Beω ω+ =  (1) 
where 0.B >  
I assume that human capital is also the effective labor supply which implies that 
human capital attainment and earning capabilities are equivalent. The aggregate (and 
average) level of human capital of generation t  is 
 ( ) ( )
t
t t tH h dω µ ωΩ= ∫  (2) 
The initial human capital endowments, 0 ( )h ω  for all 0 ,ω∈Ω  are assumed to be given. 
 
2.2.  Production 
The production sector of the economy consists of private, perfectly competitive, firms 
producing a capital/consumption good by means of a constant returns to scale, time 
invariant technology, utilizing physical as well as human capital. The aggregate 
production function is given by 
 
1
t t tY AK H
α α−=
 (3) 
where 0A > , 0 1α< < , while Kt is the aggregate supply of physical capital in period t . 
The coefficient A  characterizes the total factor productivity. 
 Perfect competition in the factors markets ensures that each factor is paid its 
marginal product so that the wage rate, tw , and the rental rate, tR , in period t , 
respectively, are given by 
 
(1 ) / (1 )t t t t tw Y H AK Hα αα α −= − = −  (4) 
 
1 1/t t t t tR Y K AK H
α αα α − −= =
 (5) 
 
2.3.  Longevity 
Individuals live for three periods. The first and second periods both have length 1. The 
third period length is individually determined. For individual ω , the third period length is 
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( ( )) 1tT h ω ≤ ; thus, individual ω ’s longevity is 2 ( ( )).tT h ω+  ( ( ))tT h ω  is assumed to be 
an increasing function, so longevity increases with human capital. The function 
encompasses two assumptions: l) human capital is defined as a single variable 
incorporating both investments in health and education, and 2) human capital investments 
are made during the period labeled ‘youth’. 
The first assumption is justified by the fact that health and education are 
positively correlated, as observed in the data: higher levels of education are correlated 
with longer life expectancy. In fact, untangling the direction of causality, if any, is quite 
complex.24 The empirical evidence for a positive correlation between education and 
longevity is quite robust. Lillard and Waite (1995), Deaton and Paxson (1999), and Smith 
(1999) all find strong positive effects of education on life expectancy for the U.S. Similar 
findings are obtained by Attanasio and Emmerson (2001) for the U.K., von Gaudecker 
and Scholz (2007) for Germany, and Mesrine (1999) for France, among many others. 
Several causes for this correlation have been identified, some of which are causal (see 
Winkleby et al. (1992), Dewar (1998), Margettsa et al. (1998), Farbar and Levy (2000), 
and Lamerz et al. (2005)). The main causes identified are that higher educated individuals 
have better access to medical insurance, they are more able to utilize medical services, 
they eat healthier, and they have less physically demanding jobs. These causes have been 
identified to affect both individuals’ health and the health of their children.25 
Researchers continue to study why health and education are positively correlated. 
Recent research using general equilibrium models suggest that investments in health and 
education are complementary (see Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Finlay (2006)). 
Without using a causality assumption, this new research suggests that those who invest in 
                                                 
24
 Grossman (2003) finds that education effects are causal but is less conclusive with regard to the 
identification of specific mechanisms. Fuchs (2004) discusses the complexities of disentangling the 
health/education relationship. 
25
 The relationship between health and education has been studied extensively over the last three decades 
with two notable works of Grossman (1972) and Fuchs (1982). Recent work by Bhattacharya and Qiao 
(2006), Chakraborty and Das (2005), Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006), Kalemli-Ozcan et al, (2000), Sanso 
and Aísa (2006), Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003), among many others, continue to provide evidence for such 
relationship. 
105 
education necessarily invest in health as well. Exploiting this complementary 
relationship, I permit human capital to incorporate both health and education investments. 
The second assumption states that investments in human capital occur during 
youth. This is justifiable since the main emphasis of this paper is not on lifecycle 
healthcare behaviors, but on the distributional implications of unequal access to human 
capital investment. The youth period seems the most reasonable period for human capital 
investments as there is a clear pattern of investing in education during primary years, and 
empirical evidence indicates a strong causal effect of parents’ controlled input on 
children’s education and health (see Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, (2002), Case, Fertig, 
and Paxson (2005), Chen and Li (2009), and Desai and Alva (1998), among many 
others). 
The assumption that longevity is a function of human capital or earnings 
capability continues to be used in the social security literature. In Bethencourt and 
Galasso (2001), the longevity function takes individuals’ ability type and public health as 
inputs to study the impact of Medicare on the size of Social Security.26 Borck (2007) 
assumes longevity to be solely a function of one’s income to study different voting 
outcomes on social security taxes. Hachon (2008) uses a similar framework to Borck 
(2007) to analyze the progressivity of various social security systems. 
 
2.4.   Government 
The government provides a social security system. This is financed through wage income 
tax revenue whereas the government must clear its budget each period. The social 
security system is annuity-based and PAYG, which redistributes revenue from current 
workers to current retirees. Contributions into the pension system are made through a 
constant and uniform tax, τ , on current workers’ earnings. During retirement, 
individuals receive a pension per unit of time until death. The pension individual ω  of 
generation 1t −  receives during retirement is given by 
                                                 
26
 This is an extension of Philpson and Becker (1998) who analyze the complementarity of Medicare and 
Social Security. They find that individuals live ‘excessively’ due to Medicare providing a vehicle for 
individuals to live longer so as to gain social security benefits for a longer time. 
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 1( ) ( ( ))t t t t tP w H T hω ν ω−=  (6) 
where tν  is the benefit replacement rate in period t  which is set to balance the 
government’s pension budget. 
Given (6), the budget for the government’s pension system is 
 
1
1( ) ( )
t
t t t tP d w Hω µ ω τ
−
−Ω
=∫  (7) 
 
2.5.  Preferences and Budget Constraints 
All individuals of generation t  have identical intertemporal preferences over 
consumption when young, 
,t tc , consumption intensity (or per unit of time) when old, 
, 1t tc + , and the level of human capital attainment of his child, 1th + , expressed by
27
 
 
, , 1 1ln ( ) ln lnt t t t t tc T h c hδ+ ++ +  (8) 
where δ  is the degree of altruistic concern over the human capital of his offspring.28 As 
discussed in Section 2.3., ( )tT h  is the length of the retirement period. 
The budget constraints of individual ω  of generation t  are 
 
,
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t t t t t tc s e w hω ω ω τ ω+ + = −  (9) 
 
, 1 1 1( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tT h c R s Pω ω ω ω+ + += +  (10) 
where ( )t tw h ω  is the individual’s gross wage income, ( )ts ω  and ( )te ω  are savings and 
private investment in children’s human capital, respectively. 
 
2.6.  Individual’s Maximization Problem 
According to the model’s description, each individual ω  solves the problem 
 
, , 1 1{ , }
max ln ( ) ( ( )) ln ( ) ln ( )
t t
t t t t t t
s e
c T h c hω ω ω δ ω+ ++ +  
                                                 
27
 Similar to Zhang, Zhang, and Leung (2006), individuals equalize consumption at each point of time 
during working age and retirement leading to 
1
, ,0
( ) ( )
t t t t
u c dt u c=∫  and , 1 , 10 ( ) 1 ( )
T
t t t t
u c dt Tu c
+ +
+ =∫ . 
28
 Note that equation (8) contains a warm glow formulation of imperfect altruism. See Osang and Sarkar 
(2007) for a discussion on the justification for this type of preferences. 
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,
, 1 1 1
1
. . ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t
s t c s e w h
T h c R s P
h Be
ω ω ω τ ω
ω ω ω ω
ω ω
+ + +
+
+ + = −
= +
=
 (11) 
taking government policy variables, 1,  , and ( ),t tE Pτ ω+  and the values tw  and 1tR +  as 
given. There is no nonnegativity constraint on ts .
29
 I now proceed to the general 
equilibrium analysis. 
 
 
3.  Definition of Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium 
Given the human capital endowments, 0 ( )h ω  for all 0ω∈Ω  and the initial physical 
capital stock, 1,K−  a dynamic competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences of 
distributions of individual household decisions 
, , 1 0{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}t t t t t t tc c s eω ω ω ω ∞+ = , the 
sequences of aggregate amounts of physical capital and effective labor 0{ , }t t tK H ∞= , the 
sequences of factor prices 0{ , }t t tw R ∞= , and the sequences of distributions of government 
transfers 0{ ( )}t tP ω ∞=  such that: 
(1) Individuals Solve Maximization Problem: For each tω∈Ω  and 0,1,...,t =  
the collection 
, , 1 1( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )t t t t t t tc c s e hω ω ω ω ω+ +  solves the individual’s 
problem (11) 
(2) Competitive Factor Markets: Factor prices are given by (4) and (5).  
(3) Goods, Human Capital, and Physical Capital Markets Clear: Markets 
clear so that the goods and aggregate stocks are given by 
 
1
, 1, 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t t t t t t tY c d c dω µ ω ω µ ω
−
− −Ω Ω
= +∫ ∫  (12) 
 ( ) ( )
t
t t tH h dω µ ωΩ= ∫  (13) 
 
1
1 1( ) ( )
t
t t tK s dω µ ω
−
− −Ω
= ∫  (14) 
                                                 
29
 This is a simplification in the model since individuals know their social security pensions during their 
working years and there is no uncertainty about longevity of a specific individual. 
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(4) Government Service: Government pension budget is given by 
 
1
1( ) ( ) (1 )
t
t t tP d Yω µ ω τ α
−
−Ω
= −∫  (15) 
 
4.  Solving the Model 
Given the basic set-up and definition of dynamic general equilibrium, I now solve the 
model and provide the decision rules. The first order conditions for the individual’s 
maximization problem are 
 
1
1 1 , 1
1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
t
t t t t t t t t t t
R
w h e s R s P T h cτ ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
+
+ + +
=
− − − + −
 (16) 
 
 
1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tw h e s e
δ
τ ω ω ω ω
=
− − −
 (17) 
 
Using (16) and (17) along with (9) and (10) provides the decision rules: 
 
1
1
( )(1 ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ( ))(1 ) ( ) t tt t t t t
t
P
s T h w h
R
γ ω δ ω
ω γ ω ω τ ω +
+
+
= − −
 (18) 
and 
 
1
1
( )( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) tt t t t
t
P
e w h
R
ω
ω γ ω δ τ ω +
+
 
= − + 
 
 (19) 
where 1( ) (1 ( ( )) )t tT hγ ω ω δ −= + + . When longevity is independent of human capital 
attainment, all individuals have identical longevities, and thereby ( )tγ ω γ= . This implies 
that everyone spends identical fixed fractions on savings and investments in children’s 
human capital. When longevity is dependent on human capital attainment, γ  is 
dependent on the length of retirement. It is easy to see that if the retirement period is 
short (long), then γ  is large (small) and thereby, individuals invest more (less) on their 
children’s human capital and save less (more).30 
                                                 
30
 This dynamic is quite similar to Ehrilich and Lui (1991) who show that exogenous increases in longevity 
increase long-run growth. 
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To solve the model, I combine (7) with (4) and (5) to express the discounted 
social security pension in terms of savings 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ( ))
( ( )) ( )
t
t t t t t
t t t t
P w H T h
R R T h d
ω τ ω
ω µ ω
+ + + +
+ +
Ω
= ⋅
∫
 (20) 
where 
 
1 11 1
1
1
1 ) 1 ) ( ) ( )
t
t t
t t
t
w H K s d
R
α α α α ω µ ω− −+ + + Ω
+
= ( − = ( − ∫  
The first term on the right hand side of equation (20) is the inter-generational transfer 
which is equal to the present value of the aggregate social security benefits received by 
generation t  retirees. The second term on the right hand side characterizes the degree of 
intra-generational redistribution among retirees by generation t  retirees. When longevity 
is identical across all individuals, this term equals 1 which implies that social security 
benefits are uniformly distributed across retirees. 
Substituting (20) into (18) yields individual ω ’s savings as a function of 
predetermined variables, exogenous parameters, and current period aggregate savings 
    
(1 ) ( ) ( ( )) 1 )( ) ( ( )) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( )) ( )
t
t t
t t t t t t
t t
T h
s T h w h s d
T h d
δ γ ω ω τ α
ω ω γ ω τ ω ω µ ω
α ω µ ω Ω
Ω
+ ( −
= − − ∫
∫
 (21) 
Integrating (21) over all individuals of generation t  yields the equation for aggregate 
savings and next period’s physical capital stock in accordance to (14). The integration of 
(21) is analytically tractable when longevity is independent of human capital attainment 
and analytically untractable when longevity is dependent on human capital attainment. I 
first solve the model analytically, assuming that longevity is independent of human 
capital attainment and then assume that longevity is dependent on human capital 
attainment and proceed to numerical integrate (21) to solve for aggregate savings in order 
to study the effects of social security on welfare and growth.31 
 Assuming that longevity is independent of human capital, the next period’s 
physical capital stock is 
                                                 
31
 I follow the solution method of Glomm and Kaganovich (2008) when longevity is independent of human 
capital attainment. 
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 1
(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
t
t
T YK
T
α γ τ α
α γ τ α+
− −
=
+ − −
 (22) 
Now using (20) in (1) with (19) and (22), I obtain the expression for the human capital of 
the children: 
 1
( )( ) (1 )(1 ) tt t
t
hh B Y
H
ω
ω δγ τ α ψ+
 
= − − + 
 
 (23) 
where 
 
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
T
T
τ α γ
ψ
α τ α γ
−
=
+ − −
 
Integrating (23) over all individuals yields next period’s human capital stock 
 [ ]1 (1 )(1 ) 1t tH B Yδγ τ α ψ+ = − − +  (24) 
Using (22) and (24) in (3), I obtain the expression for stationary growth: 
 
1(1 )
(1 )
D Cg
T C
ατ
α δ
−−
=
+ +
 (25) 
where (1 )C τ α α= − +  and 1(1 )( ) ( )D A B Tα αα δ α−= − . 
 Expression (25) makes it clear that, for certain parameter values, the size of the 
social security system will positively or negatively affect growth. The following 
condition assures that the growth rate is positive when social security is marginally 
increased from 0τ = :32 
 2
(1 (1 )(1 ))
(1 )
TT δ α δ α
α
+ + + − +
>
−
 (26) 
This condition makes it clear that if the concern for consumption in retirement, as 
indicated by the lengthen of retirement is sufficiently high, then social security enhances 
growth. The concern on consumption in retirement can be lower if the altruistic concern 
for children’s human capital or the return on physical capital is sufficiently low. 
I now assume that longevity is dependent on human capital attainment. To solve 
the model numerically, I assume the following explicit deterministic functional form of 
the relationship between longevity and human capital attainment: 
                                                 
32
 This condition is invalid when τ  is large. 
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( )( ( )) ( )
t
t
t
ahT h
b h
ω
ω
ω
=
+
 (27) 
where 0 1a≤ ≤  and 0 b≤ < ∞ . The parameter a  determines the upper bound on the 
length of the retirement period. The parameter b  affects the dependency of longevity on 
human capital. When 0,b =  longevity and human capital are independent and all 
individuals have identical longevities equal to length a . This corresponds to the 
commonly used constant probability of survival function in the literature. When 0b > , 
longevity is dependent on human capital and has the following properties: ( ) 0,T h′ >  
T ( ) 0,h′′ <  (0) 0,T =  lim  ( ) .
h
T h a
→∞
→  The function is concave which permits diminishing 
returns for longevity from increases in human capital. This is in line with the data which 
reveal that increases in education and health investments from lower levels tend to 
produce relatively larger increases in longevity.33 Lastly, when 1,a b= =  (27) is the 
probability of survival function as in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty (2004), 
Finlay (2006), and Osang and Sarkar (2007). 
In the next section present the results to the numerical analysis of the model. 
Rather than pursuing a calibration exercise, I set parameter values which are consistent in 
the findings in the literature.34 I set the total factor productivity parameters for goods 
production and human capital production equal to 3.8. This is close to the minimum 
values required for growth to be sustained in all simulations. For the preference 
parameter, I assume an altruism value of .5δ = . This value forces individuals to care 
more about consumption than their child’s human capital. The initial human capital 
distribution is assumed to be log-normally distributed with a mean of 1 and a variance of 
1. The longevity parameter is set at .6a =  corresponding to U.S. life expectancy data for 
2005-2015 (See Table A.17 of the United Nations World Population Prospects: 2006 
                                                 
33
 See Glied and Lleras-Muney (2003) and Culter and Lleras-Muney (2006) who both analyze the health-
education gradient. 
34
 There is one parameter which is non-standard from the literature, δ. The altruism parameter, δ, does not 
have a reliable estimate.  
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revision).35 The value of b  is taken to be set at either 0 corresponding with longevity 
being independent of human capital attainment or a value of 1 corresponding to longevity 
being dependent on human capital attainment. This permits sufficient dispersion in 
longevity. Lastly, I set the capital share to assure condition (26) holds. 
In all simulations, I numerically verify that the equilibrium value of aggregate 
savings is uniquely defined in all periods and that all markets clear. I compute the growth 
rate as the percentage change in output from one period to the next and measure all 
inequalities using the Gini coefficient. 
 
 
5.  Analysis of the Model 
In this section I conduct policy experiments when a PAYG Beveridgian type social 
security scheme is introduced. I first assume that longevity is independent of human 
capital and study the effects of implementing social security on welfare inequality and 
growth. I then assume that longevity is dependent on human capital attainment and study 
the effects of implementing social security on welfare inequality and growth. 
 
Numerical Result 5.1.  Assume that the parametric assumptions stated in Section 4 hold 
and that longevity is independent of human capital attainment, i.e., it is identical across 
all individuals. Then if a Beveridgian social security system is implemented at time 0,t =  
there exists a threshold tax rate ˆ (0,1)τ ∈  such that the following is true in comparison to 
the baseline case without social security: 
(i) If the social security tax, ,τ  is less than or equal to τˆ , then aggregate human 
capital and output are higher in all subsequent periods 1, 2,t = K  
(ii) If the social security tax, ,τ  is greater than or equal to τ , then aggregate 
human capital is higher while aggregate physical capital and output are 
lower in all subsequent periods 1, 2,t = K . 
                                                 
35
 One period duration is 30 years so that people retire at age 60. When longevity is independent of human 
capital, the average life expectancy for the initial working-age generation is 78 years. 
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Furthermore, for all τ , distributions of welfare, human capital attainment, and longevity 
become strictly more equal in all subsequent periods 1, 2,t = K ; 
 
 This is the benchmark result which is known in the literature (see Kaganovich and 
Zilcha (1999) and Glomm and Kaganovich (2008). If all individuals have identical 
longevity, which do not change over time, then propensities to invest in children’s human 
capital and to save are also identical across individuals and constant over time. The result 
of implementing a Beveridgian social security system is that the inequalities in human 
capital attainment and welfare become strictly more equal while growth may increase or 
decrease compared to an economy without social security. The Beveridgian formula 
provides additional resources to those with lower levels of human capital. These 
resources are used to increase consumption, savings, and investments in their children’s 
human capital. Thus, implementing social security leads to a more equal distribution of 
human capital and welfare. 
The effect of social security on growth depends critically on the size of social 
security system. If the social security system of small magnitude is introduced, this will 
enhance growth. The main channel to higher growth is through increasing the stock of 
human capital. The PAYG design creates incentives for current workers to invest in the 
next generation’s human capital, to increase their own social security benefits in 
retirement. If the increase in children’s human capital is sufficiently large, it compensates 
for the decrease in savings caused by the PAYG design, and output is enhanced. When 
the social security system is large, the increase in human capital is not sufficient to 
overcome the loss of savings. This causes output to decline. I now proceed to analyze the 
comparative dynamics when longevity is dependent on human capital attainment. 
The result that social security enhances growth is conditional upon the chosen 
parameter value given in Section 4. Condition (26) must be satisfied, in other words, 
individuals’ concern for consumption in retirement must be sufficiently strong. Similar 
conditions are provided in Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Glomm and Kaganovich 
(2008) when financing social security competes with financing public education. My 
computational results indicate that, for the chosen parameter values, the threshold, τˆ , is 
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approximately 16%. The tax threshold, τˆ , adjusts downward when the degree of altruism 
or the return on physical capital are larger. It should be quite clear that if condition (26) is 
not satisfied, then social security will not enhance growth regardless of the size of social 
security. Since this paper analyzes the effect of the dependence assumption of longevity 
on human capital attainment, I assume condition (26) holds for all experiments. 
 
Numerical Result 5.2.  Assume that the parametric assumptions in Section 4 hold and 
that longevity depends on human capital attainment according to expression (27). Then if 
a Beveridgian social security system is implemented at time 0,t =  there exist threshold 
tax rates , (0,1)τ τ ∈  whereτ τ<  and a finite period s such that, the following is true in 
comparison to the baseline case without social security: 
 
(i) If the social security tax, ,τ  is less than τ , then aggregate human capital and 
output are higher in all subsequent periods 1, 2,t = K  
(ii) If the social security tax is τ  is between  and ,τ τ  then 
a. aggregate human capital is higher while output is lower in periods 
1,2, ,t s= K   
b. aggregate human capital and output are higher while physical capital 
is lower in all subsequent periods 1,  2,  t s s= + + K   
(iii)If the social security tax, ,τ  is greater than ,τ  then aggregate human capital 
is higher while physical capital and output are lower in all subsequent periods 
1, 2,t = K ;  
Furthermore, for all τ , distributions of welfare, human capital attainment, and longevity 
become strictly more equal in all subsequent periods 1, 2,t = K ; 
 
Similar to Numerical Result 5.1., if the social security system is sufficiently small, 
it enhances growth. When social security is implemented, investments in human capital 
of the younger generation rise in response to the new incentives to invest in children’s 
human capital for higher social security benefits. Individuals decrease their savings in 
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response to receiving social security benefits during retirement. Since the increase in 
human capital is greater than the loss of savings, output rises. 
 Contrary to the benchmark results, as the social security system becomes larger, 
the results exhibit an intertemporal non-monotonic relationship between growth and 
welfare inequality. In the short-run, welfare inequality decreases along with output while, 
in the long-run, output increases. There are two effects from implementing social security 
which drive this result, one which is standard and the other which is a new insight 
provided by this paper. 
The first one is that the PAYG Beveridgian formula causes individuals to increase 
investments in the younger generation’s human capital and save less for retirement. The 
Beveridgian formula causes lifetime resources of the poor to increase while the lifetime 
resources of wealthy  decrease. This, in turn, increases investment in children’s human 
capital of the poor and decreases investment in children’s human capital of the wealthy.36 
Since poorer individuals have higher propensities to invest in their children’s human 
capital, the increase in investment in children’s human capital of the poor is great than the 
decrease in investment of the wealthy. Thus, aggregate human capital of the younger 
generation rises while the distribution of human capital becomes more equal. When 
social security is large, the increase in human capital is not sufficient to compensate for 
the decrease in savings from the PAYG design, lowering output in the short-run. 
The second effect is the dynamic externality of lengthened children’s longevity 
due to increasing their human capital. As longevity lengthens, individuals increase the 
fraction of resources devoted to savings while reducing the fraction devoted to 
investment in children’s human capital. The overall effect on human capital accumulation 
and savings is conditional on how much longevity lengthens. To provide intuition on 
these results, I update equations (18) and (19) one period and partially differentiate them 
with respect to human capital. This provides the change in savings and investments in 
                                                 
36
 The specification of the human capital production function can significantly change this result. For 
instance, in Glomm and Kaganovich (2008) private investments in human capital are in the form of a time 
input. Implementing social security results in all individuals increasing their time input with their children. 
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children’s human capital when the younger generation’s human capital is increased. 
Differentiating (18) and (19) with respect to th  yields: 
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and 
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The first term in (28) is the direct effect of increasing children’s human capital on 
their savings. As children’s human capital rises, concern for their retirement increases 
causing their savings to rise. The second term in (28) is the effect of increasing social 
security benefits on savings. This is standard in the literature, as social security benefits 
rise (in this case due to a longer retirement period) individuals save less. The third term in 
(28) is the effect of the dynamic externality on savings. As longevity increases, 
individuals save more for retirement. 
 Similarly, the first term in (29) is the direct effect of increasing children’s human 
capital on investment in their children’s human capital. As children’s human capital rises, 
additional income is available to increase investment in their children’s human capital. 
The second term in (29) is the effect of increasing social security benefits on investments 
in their children’s human capital. As pension benefits increase, lifetime resources 
increase and, in part, are used to increase investment in human capital. The third term in 
(29) is the effect of the dynamic externality. As longevity increases, it causes individuals 
to invest less in their children’s human capital and more to toward their retirement. 
There are a few comments which need to be discussed. The first is that both 
effects are much stronger with respect to savings than investments in human capital. The 
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second is that diminishing returns on longevity from increasing human capital imply that, 
at some point, the second and third term of both (28) and (29) will approach zero. The 
third is that the concavity of the longevity function in human capital attainment implies 
that the effect of social security and the dynamic externality are larger for those with 
lower levels of human capital than those with higher levels of human capital. Fourth, if 
the increase in human capital is sufficiently large, then the effect of social security and 
the dynamic externality on investments in human capital will not decrease human capital 
of the next generation. Even if this holds for investments in human capital, this does not 
have to hold for savings. Thus, in the long-run, implementing PAYG social security can 
cause the stock of human capital to grow while savings to increase due to the dynamic 
externality, raising output in the long-run. 
When social security becomes excessively large, welfare inequality declines at a 
cost of lower growth in the short-run and in the long-run. If the tax rate becomes too 
high, then the increase in children’s human capital is not sufficient to compensate for the 
large reduction in savings. Even with future generations’ increased concern for 
retirement, the stock of human capital and savings do not rise sufficiently to compensate 
for the loss of savings from the large social security in production. 
 The chosen parameter values provide the period and tax thresholds in which 
social security enhances growth. The tax threshold, τ , which guarantees that social 
security enhances growth is 14% while the other tax threshold, τ , is 17%. For a tax rate 
of 15%, growth will be enhanced after the second period social security is implemented 
while after the fifth period output is higher. Assuming that a period length is 30 years, the 
positive effects on growth of implementing social security take roughly 60 years to be 
effective. If the model had more working periods, this would shorten the number of 
periods required before growth is enhanced. 
 
 
6.   Conclusion 
In this paper, I explore the effects of implementing a PAYG Beveridgian social security 
system on growth and welfare inequality, when longevity may depend on human capital 
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attainment. To study these dynamical effects, I construct a model of overlapping 
generations populated by heterogeneous individuals. I assume individuals are 
heterogeneous due to their parents’ investments in their human capital. When longevity is 
independent on human capital attainment, standard benchmark results are established, 
which are also found in the literature. I then extend the framework to permit longevity to 
be dependent on human capital attainment. When longevity is dependent on human 
capital, implementing a PAYG social security system reduces inequality but additionally 
raises the longevity of the next generation through increases in human capital attainment. 
This inter-temporal externality has implications on the propensities to save and invest in 
human capital. 
The analysis reveals that the assumption on the dependency of longevity on 
human capital attainment and the size of social security play dominant roles in 
determining the effect on growth. When the social security system is small, implementing 
social security enhances growth regardless of the dependency assumption of longevity on 
human capital attainment. As the social security system becomes large, the decline in 
savings becomes increasingly more difficult to compensate in production. The dynamic 
externality of raising longevity, due to increasing human capital, raises individuals 
concern for retirement and causing them to save more. This compensates for the negative 
effect of PAYG social security on growth and results in a temporally non-monotonic 
growth path: in the short-run, growth declines while in the long-run, growth is higher. For 
excessively large social security system, growth declines along the entire transition path 
regardless of the dependency assumption of longevity on human capital attainment. 
While this model makes a step toward a better understanding of the impact of 
endogenous longevity on growth and welfare inequality, further research is needed to 
extend the endogeneity of individuals’ longevity. Models which permit individuals to 
directly influence their own health through preventative medical services during 
adulthood and life-extending medical procedures during retirement are required to more 
fully capture the effects of social security. 
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Appendix A: Numerical Result 5.1. 
 
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.00 51.6 0.0 61.7 2.6 444         144         1,510        
1 0.00 51.6 0.0 41.9 2.6 619         543         2,320        
2 0.00 51.6 0.0 31.7 2.6 952         835         3,570        
3 0.00 51.6 0.0 25.5 2.6 1,466      1,286      5,500        
4 0.00 51.6 0.0 21.3 2.6 2,256      1,979      8,460        
5 0.00 51.6 0.0 18.3 2.6 3,473      3,046      13,020      
6 0.00 51.6 0.0 16.1 2.6 5,345      4,689      20,050      
7 0.00 51.6 0.0 14.3 2.6 8,227      7,217      30,860      
8 0.00 51.6 0.0 12.9 2.6 12,664    11,109    47,500      
9 0.00 51.6 0.0 11.7 2.6 19,492    17,098    73,110      
10 0.00 51.6 0.0 10.8 2.6 30,003    26,318    112,530    
11 0.00 51.6 0.0 9.9 2.6 46,180    40,510    173,200    
12 0.00 51.6 0.0 9.2 2.6 71,080    62,350    266,600    
13 0.00 51.6 0.0 8.6 2.6 109,410  95,980    410,400    
14 0.00 51.6 0.0 8.1 2.6 168,410  147,730  631,600    
15 0.00 51.6 0.0 7.6 2.6 259,220  227,380  972,200    
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.05 51.6 0.0 51.8 2.6 444         144         1,510        
1 0.05 45.2 0.0 25.8 2.6 671         406         2,420        
2 0.05 39.5 0.0 15.8 2.6 1,079      653         3,900        
3 0.05 34.6 0.0 10.8 2.6 1,736      1,050      6,270        
4 0.05 30.3 0.0 7.8 2.6 2,793      1,690      10,090      
5 0.05 26.6 0.0 5.8 2.6 4,493      2,718      16,240      
6 0.05 23.3 0.0 4.4 2.6 7,228      4,373      26,120      
7 0.05 20.4 0.0 3.5 2.6 11,627    7,034      42,020      
8 0.05 17.9 0.0 2.8 2.6 18,703    11,314    67,590      
9 0.05 15.6 0.0 2.2 2.6 30,086    18,201    108,720    
10 0.05 13.7 0.0 1.8 2.6 48,396    29,278    174,890    
11 0.05 12.0 0.0 1.5 2.6 77,900    47,100    281,300    
12 0.05 10.5 0.0 1.2 2.6 125,200  75,760    452,600    
13 0.05 9.2 0.0 1.0 2.6 201,400  121,870  728,000    
14 0.05 8.1 0.0 0.8 2.6 324,100  196,040  1,171,000 
15 0.05 7.1 0.0 0.7 2.6 521,300  315,350  1,883,800 
Numerical Result 5.1.i.: Transition Path With Beveridgian Social Secuirty Under The Assumption 
of Identical Longevity
Numerical Result 5.1.: Baseline Transition Path Under The Assumption of Identical Longevity 
(No Social Security)
Table A.1.:  Numerical Result 5.1.
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t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.10 51.6 0.0 38.2 2.6 444              144           1,510             
1 0.10 41.8 0.0 18.8 2.6 687              317           2,420             
2 0.10 33.9 0.0 11.2 2.6 1,101           508           3,870             
3 0.10 27.5 0.0 7.3 2.6 1,765           815           6,210             
4 0.10 22.3 0.0 5.0 2.6 2,829           1,306        9,950             
5 0.10 18.0 0.0 3.5 2.6 4,535           2,094        15,950           
6 0.10 14.6 0.0 2.6 2.6 7,268           3,356        25,570           
7 0.10 11.8 0.0 1.9 2.6 11,650         5,379        40,980           
8 0.10 9.6 0.0 1.4 2.6 18,674         8,621        65,680           
9 0.10 7.8 0.0 1.0 2.6 29,932         13,819      105,280         
10 0.10 6.3 0.0 0.8 2.6 47,978         22,150      168,750         
11 0.10 5.1 0.0 0.6 2.6 76,900         35,500      270,500         
12 0.10 4.1 0.0 0.5 2.6 123,300       56,910      433,600         
13 0.10 3.4 0.0 0.4 2.6 197,600       91,220      695,000         
14 0.10 2.7 0.0 0.3 2.6 316,700       146,210    1,113,900      
15 0.10 2.2 0.0 0.2 2.6 507,600       234,360    1,785,500      
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.17 51.6 0.0 31.1 2.6 444              144           1,510             
1 0.17 39.1 0.0 15.4 2.6 677              235           2,320             
2 0.17 29.6 0.0 9.0 2.6 1,040           361           3,560             
3 0.17 22.5 0.0 5.6 2.6 1,598           554           5,460             
4 0.17 17.0 0.0 3.7 2.6 2,454           851           8,390             
5 0.17 12.9 0.0 2.5 2.6 3,768           1,307        12,880           
6 0.17 9.8 0.0 1.7 2.6 5,788           2,007        19,780           
7 0.17 7.4 0.0 1.2 2.6 8,889           3,082        30,380           
8 0.17 5.6 0.0 0.8 2.6 13,651         4,733        46,660           
9 0.17 4.3 0.0 0.6 2.6 20,966         7,269        71,660           
10 0.17 3.2 0.0 0.4 2.6 32,200         11,164      110,060         
11 0.17 2.5 0.0 0.3 2.6 494,500       17,150      169,000         
12 0.17 1.9 0.0 0.2 2.6 759,500       26,330      259,600         
13 0.17 1.4 0.0 0.2 2.6 1,166,500    40,440      398,700         
14 0.17 1.1 0.0 0.1 2.6 1,791,500    62,110      612,300         
15 0.17 0.8 0.0 0.1 2.6 2,751,400    95,390      940,400         
Numerical Result 5.1.ii.: Transition Path With Beveridgian Social Secuirty Under The Assumption of 
Identical Longevity
Numerical Result 5.1.i.: Baseline Transition Path Under The Assumption of Identical Longevity (No 
Social Security)
Table A.1. con.:  Numerical Result 5.1.
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t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.18 51.6 0.0 30.5 2.6 444              1,440       1,510       
1 0.18 38.8 0.0 15.1 2.6 674              2,257       2,300       
2 0.18 29.2 0.0 8.8 2.6 1,026           3,437       3,500       
3 0.18 22.0 0.0 5.5 2.6 1,563           5,234       5,320       
4 0.18 16.5 0.0 3.6 2.6 2,381           7,971       8,110       
5 0.18 12.5 0.0 2.4 2.6 3,626           12,139     12,350     
6 0.18 9.4 0.0 1.6 2.6 5,522           18,486     18,810     
7 0.18 7.1 0.0 1.1 2.6 8,409           28,153     28,640     
8 0.18 5.3 0.0 0.8 2.6 12,806         42,876     43,620     
9 0.18 4.0 0.0 0.6 2.6 19,503         65,296     66,430     
10 0.18 3.0 0.0 0.4 2.6 29,701         99,441     101,170   
11 0.18 2.3 0.0 0.3 2.6 45,230         15,140     154,100   
12 0.18 1.7 0.0 0.2 2.6 688,900       23,060     234,600   
13 0.18 1.3 0.0 0.1 2.6 1,049,100    35,120     357,300   
14 0.18 1.0 0.0 0.1 2.6 1,597,700    53,490     544,200   
15 0.18 0.7 0.0 0.1 2.6 2,433,100    81,460     828,800   
Numerical Result 5.1.ii.: Transition Path With Beveridgian Social Secuirty Under The Assumption 
of Identical Longevity
Table A.1. con.:  Numerical Result 5.1.
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Appendix B: Numerical Result 5.2. 
 
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0 51.6 14.6 49.0 2.42 444         144         1,510           
1 0 46.0 8.1 29.4 2.50 711         485         2,600           
2 0 42.1 4.4 20.7 2.55 1,176      868         4,340           
3 0 39.7 2.5 15.8 2.58 1,894      1,487      7,020           
4 0 38.1 1.5 12.8 2.59 3,001      2,453      11,180         
5 0 37.2 0.9 10.7 2.59 4,707      3,945      17,570         
6 0 36.6 0.6 9.3 2.60 7,333      6,247      27,420         
7 0 36.2 0.4 8.2 2.60 11,376    9,792      42,580         
8 0 35.9 0.2 7.3 2.60 17,599    15,250    65,930         
9 0 35.8 0.2 6.6 2.60 27,179    23,653    101,850       
10 0 35.7 0.1 6.1 2.60 41,924    36,586    157,150       
11 0 35.6 0.1 5.6 2.60 64,620    56,490    242,300       
12 0 35.6 0.0 5.2 2.60 99,550    87,140    373,300       
13 0 35.5 0.0 4.9 2.60 153,320  134,310  575,000       
14 0 35.5 0.0 4.6 2.60 236,090  206,910  885,400       
15 0 35.5 0.0 4.3 2.60 363,480  318,660  1,363,200    
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.05 51.6 14.6 35.6 2.42 444         144         1,510           
1 0.05 41.2 6.1 19.1 2.51 767         354         2,700           
2 0.05 33.6 2.6 11.8 2.56 1,310      666         4,650           
3 0.05 28.0 1.2 8.0 2.58 2,183      1,189      7,810           
4 0.05 23.8 0.6 5.7 2.59 3,589      2,037      12,890         
5 0.05 20.5 0.3 4.3 2.60 5,852      3,405      21,070         
6 0.05 17.7 0.2 3.3 2.60 9,493      5,606      34,220         
7 0.05 15.4 0.1 2.6 2.60 15,349    9,149      55,380         
8 0.05 13.4 0.0 2.0 2.60 24,769    14,847    89,430         
9 0.05 11.7 0.0 1.6 2.60 39,923    24,015    144,190       
10 0.05 10.3 0.0 1.3 2.60 64,300    38,762    232,280       
11 0.05 9.0 0.0 1.1 2.60 103,500  62,480    374,000       
12 0.05 7.9 0.0 0.9 2.60 166,600  100,640  601,900       
13 0.05 6.9 0.0 0.7 2.60 268,100  162,030  968,600       
14 0.05 6.0 0.0 0.6 2.60 431,300  260,770  1,558,500    
15 0.05 5.3 0.0 0.5 2.60 693,800  419,610  2,507,300    
Numerical Result 5.2.: Baseline Transition Path Under The Assumption Longevity is Dependent on 
Human Capital Attainment (No Social Security)
Numerical Result 5.2.i.: Transition Path With Beveridgian Social Secuirty Under The Assumption 
Longevity Is Dependent on Human Capital Attainment
Table B.1.:  Numerical Result 5.2.
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t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.1 51.6 14.6 31.2 2.42 444              144           1,510           
1 0.1 38.8 5.4 15.8 2.51 781              272           2,670           
2 0.1 29.5 2.1 9.2 2.56 1,319           511           4,560           
3 0.1 22.9 0.9 5.9 2.58 2,181           906           7,590           
4 0.1 18.1 0.4 3.9 2.59 3,565           1,544        12,460         
5 0.1 14.4 0.2 2.8 2.60 5,783           2,567        20,260         
6 0.1 11.6 0.1 2.0 2.60 9,339           4,208        32,770         
7 0.1 9.3 0.1 1.4 2.60 15,038         6,839        52,820         
8 0.1 7.5 0.0 1.1 2.60 24,175         11,057      84,950         
9 0.1 6.1 0.0 0.8 2.60 38,819         17,818      136,460       
10 0.1 4.9 0.0 0.6 2.60 62,291         28,655      219,020       
11 0.1 4.0 0.0 0.5 2.60 99,900         46,030      351,400       
12 0.1 3.2 0.0 0.3 2.60 160,200       73,870      563,500       
13 0.1 2.6 0.0 0.3 2.60 256,900       118,500    903,500       
14 0.1 2.1 0.0 0.2 2.60 411,800       190,030    1,448,500    
15 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.2 2.60 660,200       304,690    2,322,000    
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.15 51.6 14.6 29.2 2.42 444              144           1,510           
1 0.15 37.4 5.1 14.3 2.51 773              216           2,580           
2 0.15 27.2 1.9 8.1 2.56 1,264           395           4,280           
3 0.15 20.1 0.8 5.0 2.58 2,032           680           6,920           
4 0.15 15.1 0.4 3.2 2.59 3,230           1,126        11,050         
5 0.15 11.4 0.2 2.2 2.60 5,099           1,823        17,480         
6 0.15 8.7 0.1 1.5 2.60 8,015           2,911        27,520         
7 0.15 6.6 0.0 1.0 2.60 12,562         4,608        43,180         
8 0.15 5.1 0.0 0.7 2.60 19,654         7,255        67,600         
9 0.15 3.9 0.0 0.5 2.60 30,714         11,383      105,680       
10 0.15 3.0 0.0 0.4 2.60 47,962         17,822      165,100       
11 0.15 2.3 0.0 0.3 2.60 748,600       27,860      257,700       
12 0.15 1.8 0.0 0.2 2.60 1,168,200    43,520      402,200       
13 0.15 1.4 0.0 0.1 2.60 1,822,400    67,950      627,500       
14 0.15 1.1 0.0 0.1 2.60 2,842,800    106,030    978,800       
15 0.15 0.8 0.0 0.1 2.60 4,434,200    165,440    1,526,800    
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t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.16 51.6 14.6 29.0 2.42 444              144              1,510           
1 0.16 37.2 5.1 14.1 2.51 769              207              2,560           
2 0.16 26.8 1.9 7.9 2.56 1,249           375              4,210           
3 0.16 19.7 0.8 4.8 2.58 1,992           641              6,760           
4 0.16 14.6 0.4 3.1 2.59 3,144           1,054           10,710         
5 0.16 11.0 0.2 2.1 2.60 4,927           1,694           16,830         
6 0.16 8.3 0.1 1.4 2.60 7,688           2,687           26,300         
7 0.16 6.3 0.0 1.0 2.60 11,963         4,223           40,960         
8 0.16 4.8 0.0 0.7 2.60 18,580         6,602           63,660         
9 0.16 3.6 0.0 0.5 2.60 28,824         10,285         98,810         
10 0.16 2.8 0.0 0.3 2.60 44,683         15,986         153,210       
11 0.16 2.1 0.0 0.2 2.60 69,230         24,810         237,400       
12 0.16 1.6 0.0 0.2 2.60 107,240       384,700       367,800       
13 0.16 1.2 0.0 0.1 2.60 166,070       596,300       569,600       
14 0.16 0.9 0.0 0.1 2.60 257,150       923,700       882,100       
15 0.16 0.7 0.0 0.1 2.60 398,140       1,430,600    1,365,700    
t τ Gini(h) Gini(T) Gini(U) T H K Y
0 0.17 51.6 14.6 28.9 2.42 444              144              1,510           
1 0.17 37.1 5.0 14.1 2.51 767              203              2,550           
2 0.17 26.6 1.9 7.9 2.56 1,240           366              4,170           
3 0.17 19.5 0.8 4.8 2.58 1,971           622              6,670           
4 0.17 14.4 0.4 3.1 2.59 3,099           1,019           10,540         
5 0.17 10.8 0.2 2.0 2.60 4,838           1,633           16,490         
6 0.17 8.1 0.1 1.4 2.60 7,521           2,579           25,680         
7 0.17 6.1 0.0 1.0 2.60 11,658         4,040           39,850         
8 0.17 4.6 0.0 0.7 2.60 18,038         6,291           61,690         
9 0.17 3.5 0.0 0.5 2.60 27,876         9,764           95,380         
10 0.17 2.7 0.0 0.3 2.60 43,046         15,119         147,330       
11 0.17 2.0 0.0 0.2 2.60 66,440         23,380         227,400       
12 0.17 1.5 0.0 0.2 2.60 1,025,100    36,110         350,900       
13 0.17 1.2 0.0 0.1 2.60 1,581,300    55,740         541,400       
14 0.17 0.9 0.0 0.1 2.60 2,439,100    86,020         835,100       
15 0.17 0.7 0.0 0.1 2.60 3,761,700    132,710       1,288,000    
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